What GAO Found Use of minority- and women-owned asset managers (MWO firms) varied among nine selected federal investment plans reviewed by GAO. In 2022, 61 MWO firms managed about 3 percent of total externally managed assets across five of the nine plans (see figure). The use of MWO firms increased since GAO's prior report on the topic (GAO-17-726). Four of the nine plans did not use MWO firms. Use of Minority- and Women-Owned (MWO) Asset Management Firms by Selected Federal Plan, 2022 Federal entity officials that manage the selected federal plans and many industry stakeholders GAO spoke with said that MWO firms continue to face challenges in competing for opportunities in the asset management industry that are similar to those that GAO reported in 2017. For example, they said that MWO firms lack the size or resources to keep client fees low, a challenge larger firms can more easily overcome due to their greater capacity and resources. All seven federal entities that GAO reviewed incorporated key practices that institutional investors can use to increase opportunities for MWO firms. For example, the entities generally conducted outreach to MWO firms and communicated expectations of inclusive practices to their staff and consultants. This represents an improvement from GAO's 2017 review, which found that four of the seven federal entities had not done so. Two executive orders issued in January 2025 directed federal agencies to end diversity-related initiatives. In February 2025, officials from two federal entities said they had not determined whether the orders impacted their application of the key practices; officials from three said there would be no impact because their asset manager selection processes are merit-based; officials from one said they will remove references to MWO firms from its policies; and officials from another declined to comment. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its staff took steps to promote diversity in the asset management industry. For example, in January 2018, SEC introduced a voluntary self-assessment for regulated entities to evaluate their diversity policies and practices and report demographic information. In February 2025, SEC staff said that they were analyzing the potential impact of the executive orders on the industry self-assessment. SEC staff removed staff guidance from the SEC website that addressed investment advisers' consideration of diversity-related factors when recommending or selecting other investment advisers. Accordingly, GAO removed an assessment of this staff guidance and a related recommendation from its review. Why GAO Did This Study MWO firms managed about 1.4 percent of the $82 trillion overseen by a sample of asset management firms in 2021, according to an industry report. Some policymakers raised questions about the extent of federal entities' use of MWO firms and the challenges these firms face in competing for opportunities. GAO was asked to update its 2017 review of federal entities' use of MWO firms. This report describes selected federal entities' use of MWO firms, challenges these firms may face in competing for business, federal entities' alignment with key practices for selecting asset managers, and the status of SEC efforts regarding diversity in the asset management industry, among other objectives. GAO reviewed investment policies and financial statements of seven federal entities that manage or sponsor nine investment plans (seven retirement plans, one endowment, and one insurance program) that were also reviewed in GAO's 2017 report. GAO reviewed SEC staff reports and press releases. GAO also interviewed or held discussion groups with representatives of SEC, the federal entities, and industry stakeholders including five consulting firms, four industry associations, two researchers, 11 MWO asset management firms, five non-MWO firms, and five nonfederal plans. For more information, contact Michael E. Clements at ClementsM@gao.gov or Tranchau (Kris) T. Nguyen at NguyenTT@gao.gov.

What GAO Found As of February 2025, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Guard Bureau align their respective counterdrug policies with current federal laws. GAO did not find that the policies created limitations in terms of the counterdrug activities that DOD and the National Guard can conduct under the law. Section 284 of title 10, U.S. Code establishes categories of authorized counterdrug activities that DOD's counterdrug instruction groups into mission categories. Additionally, under section 112 of title 32, U.S. Code, members of the National Guard can perform counterdrug activities in accordance with a drug interdiction and counterdrug activities plan submitted by a state governor and approved by the Secretary of Defense. Helicopter Used by the National Guard for Aerial Reconnaissance and Illegal Drugs Seized DOD updated counterdrug policies and guidance during fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024 to clarify limitations on implementation of counterdrug activities. However, GAO did not find that these changes prevented DOD personnel from conducting these activities. For example: In February 2021, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum that prohibits DOD counterdrug program-funded analysts from engaging in activities that would require additional authorities for collecting intelligence. According to DOD officials, this change was made to clarify what types of information counterdrug program-funded analysts are allowed to collect in accordance with the law and DOD guidance. In March 2022, DOD issued guidance that limited counterdrug support to community-based organizations that are specifically identified in federal law. According to DOD officials, this change was made to ensure that National Guard outreach aligned with federal law. In April 2024, DOD updated guidance to clarify that, while National Guard counterdrug analysts can analyze data extracted from digital devices such as cell phones, they cannot perform the extraction themselves. According to DOD officials, this change in guidance was made to ensure that National Guard counterdrug analysts were not involved in the handling of evidence. Why GAO Did This Study Drug overdose deaths in the U.S., including from synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, surged during the past 25 years, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Congress appropriated approximately $1.33 billion dollars for the National Guard Counterdrug Program during fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024. This program supports federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement with drug interdiction activities in 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and U.S. Virgin Islands. The joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review certain DOD and National Guard Bureau counterdrug instructions and examine whether they limit support for counterdrug efforts under the law. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) DOD and National Guard Bureau align their counterdrug policies with applicable federal counterdrug laws; and (2) DOD's changes in guidance during fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024 clarified how counterdrug activities could be conducted. GAO identified and reviewed federal counterdrug laws; evaluated relevant DOD and National Guard Bureau policies; and reviewed changes in DOD policies and guidance related to the implementation of domestic counterdrug activities during the past 6 fiscal years. GAO also interviewed DOD, federal law enforcement, and state National Guard officials. GAO also conducted site visits to locations in California and Texas. For more information, contact Diana Moldafsky at moldafskyd@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Offshore wind energy development has various potential positive and negative impacts in several areas. These include climate and public health, marine life and ecosystems, fishing industry, economic and community, tribal resources, defense and radar systems, and maritime navigation and safety impacts. However, because it is early in U.S. deployment of commercial offshore wind projects, the extent of some impacts is unknown. Moreover, uncertainty exists about long-term and cumulative effects, and the extent of impacts will vary depending on the location, size, and type of offshore wind infrastructure. Because of the lack of definitive research related to some impacts, GAO convened a panel of 23 experts with assistance from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (National Academies) to identify and evaluate what is known about the potential impacts of offshore wind development. Among such impacts, development and operation of offshore wind energy facilities could affect marine life and ecosystems, including through acoustic disturbance and changes to marine habitats. Wind development could bring jobs and investment to communities. At the same time, it could disrupt commercial fishing to varying degrees. Turbines could also affect radar system performance, alter search and rescue methods, and alter historic and cultural landscapes. Areas of Potential Offshore Wind Energy Impacts The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) oversee offshore wind energy development. This is conducted through a multi-year permitting process that includes coordination with other agencies and stakeholders to identify and mitigate potential impacts. However, Tribes have raised concerns regarding BOEM's consultation with them. During initial planning of wind energy areas and when establishing wind lease areas, BOEM has taken steps to incorporate tribal input but has not consistently engaged in meaningful consultation with Tribes. BOEM documents indicate that it received tribal officials' concerns but do not consistently demonstrate efforts to consider or address these concerns. BOEM officials acknowledged room for improvement and released a strategy for tribal engagement in December 2024. However, its implementation plan remains unclear. Clearly demonstrating and routinely reporting on its progress would help ensure that BOEM is adequately considering tribal concerns and building trust with Tribes. Also, nearly all tribal officials that GAO interviewed said that they do not have sufficient capacity to adequately review documents or meaningfully consult with government officials and developers. Agency officials stated that consultation has been hindered by limitations in BOEM's statutory authority to provide support for tribal capacity building. Without a change to BOEM's authority, tribal input and Indigenous knowledge may not be sufficiently incorporated into decisions. Coastal Virginia Offshore Wind Pilot Project BOEM has taken steps to inform fisheries stakeholders about its process and efforts to incorporate their input when establishing a lease area for offshore wind projects. However, stakeholders remain concerned that BOEM has not adequately considered or addressed the concerns of the commercial fishing industry and fisheries management councils at that stage of the permitting process. BOEM considers competing uses of the areas under consideration for development, including commercial fishing. While BOEM has met with fishing industry representatives during the process, fishery stakeholders said they viewed BOEM's responses to input as unclear or insufficient. Moreover, it is not clear how BOEM ensures that these stakeholders are consistently included in the process and informed of BOEM's efforts to incorporate input from the industry when establishing lease areas. As a result, development of offshore wind energy could proceed without BOEM showing how it fully considers impacts to fisheries and how it will ensure developers address impacts to the fishing industry. In addition, opportunities exist for BOEM and BSEE to improve enforcement of lessees' community engagement. Lessees are to create community communication and engagement plans, but BOEM and BSEE have not established guidance for these plans. BOEM and BSEE also do not have a plan to monitor implementation and have not clarified their roles and responsibilities for monitoring implementation and enforcement. Without doing so, the agencies cannot ensure that they are fulfilling their oversight responsibilities or that lessees are effectively engaging with—and mitigating impacts to—affected communities. Finally, BOEM and BSEE have not taken steps to ensure that they have the resources in place for effective oversight of offshore wind development. Specifically, neither agency has a physical presence in the North Atlantic region where offshore wind construction is underway. BOEM and BSEE officials stated that they are building capacity to oversee development. However, neither agency has taken the necessary steps to establish a physical office for that region, as they have done in the Pacific and the area formerly known as the Gulf of Mexico. Doing so will help ensure that BOEM and BSEE have the resources in place to oversee development in the region and effectively address potential impacts, engage with stakeholders, and oversee implementation of lease requirements. Why GAO Did This Study Offshore wind energy development in the U.S. is expanding. There are active wind farms and construction in the Atlantic and planned development off the Pacific coast and in the Gulf of Mexico. BOEM and BSEE are responsible for permitting and oversight of offshore wind projects. Numerous other federal agencies provide input throughout the process. As of January 2025, BOEM had granted 39 offshore wind leases to commercial developers, but on January 20, 2025, the President issued a memorandum that, among other things, prohibits agencies from new leasing, permits, or approvals for offshore wind projects pending a review of federal wind leasing and permitting practices. As the pace of offshore wind development has accelerated, state and local communities, Tribes, and non-government entities could experience the potential effects of offshore wind development. GAO was asked to review offshore wind development in federal waters. This report examines (1) what is known about the potential impacts of offshore wind energy development, and (2) what mechanisms BOEM, in coordination with other agencies, has in place to oversee offshore wind energy development and to what extent they address potential impacts. To examine potential impacts, GAO contracted with the National Academies to identify a panel of 23 experts to include diverse participant backgrounds and cover a range of potential impact categories. These include impacts to emissions, marine life and ecosystems, and maritime navigation and safety. Information obtained through expert interviews formed the basis of GAO's findings on the potential impacts of offshore wind energy development. GAO reviewed agency documentation related to federal management of potential offshore wind development impacts from lead agencies BOEM and BSEE, as well as coordinating agencies. These included project documents, memorandums of understanding between BOEM and federal partners, and studies. In addition, GAO reviewed studies and published research findings identified through a literature search, as well as prior GAO work, including a July 2024 Technology Assessment on approaches to address environmental effects of wind energy (GAO-24-106687). To gather perspectives on potential impacts and federal oversight, GAO interviewed representatives from 22 Tribes and tribal organizations and multiple stakeholders from states, research institutes, fisheries, and industry, among others. GAO also interviewed officials from lead and coordinating agencies about potential impacts and their role in overseeing the offshore wind development and leasing process. To further examine mitigation of offshore wind impacts and discuss BOEM and BSEE oversight, GAO conducted two site visits to offshore projects with ongoing construction and operations activities.

The Department of the Interior faces challenges in its oversight of oil and gas resources on federal lands and waters. GAO has made over 100 recommendations in 11 years that aim to address challenges. About one-third of the recommendations remained open as of March 2025. The Big Picture In 2024, oil and gas production from federal leases represented 26 percent and 14 percent of all U.S. domestic production, respectively. Companies paid the Department of the Interior (Interior) almost $14 billion in revenues related to oil and gas, representing one of the largest non-tax sources of revenue for the government. Certain bureaus within Interior oversee oil and gas resources on federal lands and waters. This includes selling leases and granting permits to companies, inspecting production sites, and verifying companies pay royalties. Under policies implementing recent executive orders, Interior is to identify impediments to, and expedite, the development of oil and gas on federal lands and waters. Interior’s management of oil and gas has been on our High-Risk List since 2011. This Snapshot summarizes our recent findings from 2014 through 2024 related to federal oversight of oil and gas resources and our recommendations to Interior. What GAO’s Work Shows We identified five key areas in which Interior faces challenges. Interior strives to ensure that the federal government receives a fair return of revenues. The Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) is to ensure companies accurately pay royalties. There can be a gap between the payments ONRR collects from companies and what it should collect—called a royalty gap—which may be due in part to companies not reporting or misreporting revenues. We found in 2024 that ONRR last estimated a royalty gap of approximately $100 million in both 2010 and 2011. ➢ We recommended that ONRR consider creating a new royalty gap model and periodically estimate a royalty gap to enhance its decision-making and strategic planning of its efforts to collect and verify accurate royalties. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) relies on guidance in its management and oversight of oil and gas development on federal lands. We found in 2020—by not first working on permits that will most likely be used for drilling in the near term—BLM did not work with companies to consistently prioritize drilling permit applications. This can lead to inefficient use of BLM’s limited staff. We also found in 2021 that BLM relied on outdated leasing guidance, which could lead to inefficiencies for companies and BLM due to extra time spent interpreting the guidance. ➢ We recommended that BLM develop a documented process on how to prioritize drilling permit applications. We also recommended that BLM adjust its approach for updating its leasing guidance. Interior relies on multiple IT systems housing significant amounts of data to help it effectively oversee oil and gas activities, such as permitting, inspections, and royalty collection. We found in 2024 that BLM declared its effort to modernize its data system for tracking onshore oil and gas activities a failure in 2021 after spending at least $40 million. This led to BLM having to rely on paper records, reducing productivity. We also found in 2024 that ONRR did not have certain data that could be used to better select leases and companies for audits to determine if royalties were accurately paid. ➢ We recommended that Interior strengthen internal controls, leadership, and oversight when developing a replacement IT system, as well as assess the benefits of collecting certain data for its audits. Companies post compliance bonds, which can cover cleanup costs for oil and gas sites when they stop production. If companies’ bonds do not cover all costs, the federal government may pay the remaining costs. We found in 2019 that BLM identified 89 new orphaned wells from July 2017 through April 2019 that it may be expected to clean up because companies’ bonds were insufficient to cover such costs. We found in 2024 that the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) did not effectively ensure that companies could meet their obligations to cleanup sites in advance of potential delays, bankruptcies, or other defaults. Specifically, BOEM held about $3.5 billion in supplemental bonds to cover between $40 billion and $70 billion in total estimated post-production costs as of June 2023. ➢ We recommended Congress consider giving BLM the authority and requiring it to implement a mechanism to obtain sufficient funds from companies in the event their bonds do not cover all costs. We also recommended that BOEM complete planned actions to further develop, finalize, and fully implement changes to financial assurance regulations and procedures that reduce financial risks. Interior’s success in effectively overseeing oil and gas resources is highly dependent on whether it has the staff with the necessary skills to do so. We found in 2024 that ONRR had not prioritized hiring staff with data analysis skills. This hampered its efforts to effectively use its existing data to help better assure royalties were accurately paid. We also found in 2021 that many headquarters’ staff left the agency after BLM announced in 2019 that it was relocating its headquarters to Grand Junction, Colorado—increasing vacancies by about 169 percent. We concluded that BLM did not have an agency-wide strategic workforce plan to address these vacancies and support its mission and goals. It is unclear how ongoing reductions in staffing at Interior will affect the needed staff expertise for this work. ➢ We recommended that ONRR determine the staff necessary to analyze its data. We also recommended BLM track data on vacancies and develop a workforce plan that aligns with emerging mission goals and includes long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff. Challenges and Opportunities Oil and gas produced from federal leases supports millions of American jobs, provides lower energy costs, and ensures our energy security. From 2014 through 2024, GAO made 121 recommendations and two matters for congressional consideration across 29 reports. Interior has implemented about two-thirds of the recommendations and is generally working toward implementing the remaining recommendations. GAO’s work shows that opportunities exist for Interior to take further actions that could result in a more fair return of federal revenue, more efficient IT systems, and less federal fiscal exposure for site cleanup. For more information, contact Frank Rusco at RuscoF@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Education have taken some steps to connect college students with Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits to help them pay for food, but gaps in planning and execution remain. Effective July 2024, a new law gave Education authority to share students' Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) data with USDA and state SNAP agencies to conduct student outreach and streamline benefit administration. However, according to officials, Education had not yet developed a plan to implement these complex data-sharing arrangements. This risks delays in students getting important information that could help them access benefits they are eligible for. Following the passage of this new law, Education began providing a notification about federal benefit programs for students who may be eligible for them. However, it has not evaluated its method for identifying potentially eligible students. According to GAO analysis of 2020 Education data, Education's method could miss an estimated 40 percent of potentially SNAP-eligible students. USDA encouraged state SNAP agencies to enhance student outreach and enrollment assistance. However, USDA has not included important information about the use of SNAP data and other student data in its guidance to state SNAP agencies. These gaps in guidance have left states with questions about how to permissibly use and share students' data to help connect them with benefits. Student Food Assistance at a College Basic Needs Center Officials from the three selected states and seven colleges GAO contacted described key strategies for communicating with students about their potential SNAP eligibility. These include using destigmatizing language, linking students directly to an application or support staff, and coordinating outreach efforts with SNAP agencies. Officials from the states and colleges GAO contacted said it is helpful to have staff available on campus to assist students with the SNAP application. Some colleges have found it helpful to partner with their respective SNAP agencies to obtain information on the status of students' applications. Why GAO Did This Study According to a national survey, almost one-quarter of college students were food insecure in 2020, yet GAO found many who were potentially eligible for SNAP had not received benefits. The substantial federal investment in higher education is at risk of not serving its intended purpose if students drop out because of limited or uncertain access to food. Studies have found using data to direct outreach to those potentially eligible can increase benefit uptake. GAO was asked to review college student food insecurity. This report addresses (1) the extent to which Education and USDA have supported data use to help college students access SNAP benefits, and (2) how selected states and colleges have used student data to help connect students with SNAP benefits. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and agency documents. GAO also interviewed officials from Education, USDA, and national higher education and SNAP associations. GAO selected three states and interviewed officials from state SNAP and higher education agencies and seven colleges in these states. GAO visited one selected state in person and interviewed two virtually. States were selected based on actions to support food insecure students and stakeholder recommendations.

What GAO Found The Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) provides funding for states to improve safety at public crossings through the Railway-Highway Crossings Program (RHCP). GAO found that states used RHCP funding to address safety risks. For example, states added or upgraded existing equipment at crossings—such as bells, lights, and gates—from 2019 through 2023. During the same period, states reported that 77 percent of projects had zero crashes at the crossing before and after using program funding. State officials told GAO that RHCP projects help address the overall safety risks at crossings. Example of a State Using Railway-Highway Crossings Program Funding to Upgrade Signals, Lights, and Gates The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) introduced several changes to the program in 2021. For example, the act increased the federal cost share from 90 percent to 100 percent and expressly made pedestrian projects related to trespassing eligible for program funding. Stakeholders from six states GAO spoke with said these program changes expanded funding options and clarified funding eligibility. However, state officials said it is too soon to fully assess any safety effects from the program changes. FHWA provides technical assistance to help states improve crossing safety, but GAO found that FHWA's technical assistance does not describe or provide examples of the types of pedestrian projects related to trespassing that may be eligible for RHCP funding. Department of Transportation officials told GAO that trespassing at grade crossings is a significant concern because pedestrian fatalities and injuries at grade crossings are increasing. FHWA officials told GAO a pedestrian project is one that provides safety for pedestrians, including those who are trespassing, but GAO found that FHWA's technical assistance was not clear about the types of pedestrian projects related to trespassing that are eligible for RHCP funds. Providing additional information about such projects would better position states to reduce pedestrian fatalities and injuries at grade crossings. Why GAO Did This Study In 2023, there were nearly 1,900 crashes at railway-highway grade crossings—where railroad tracks and roads or pedestrian walkways intersect at the same level. These crashes have increasingly involved pedestrians. FHWA administers RHCP to improve safety at crossings nationwide, providing at least $245 million per year to states. IIJA introduced several changes to the program, which helped expand funding flexibility and clarify funding eligibility. IIJA includes a provision for GAO to review RHCP. This report examines (1) how states used program funding and what a subset of states reported about crossing improvements, (2) stakeholders' perspectives on program changes made by IIJA and how changes may affect safety improvements for crossings, and (3) FHWA's technical assistance to states. GAO reviewed relevant statutes and regulations and analyzed program data and crash data submitted by a subset of states. GAO interviewed FHWA and state officials, local entities, and railroads from six states—selected for program funding amounts received, among other factors. State and local perspectives are not generalizable. GAO assessed FHWA's technical assistance against federal internal control standards

What GAO Found To assume responsibility for the management of medical facilities from the military departments, the Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Health Agency (DHA) began to implement an organizational structure called the market structure in January 2020. Subsequently, DHA replaced the market structure with the network structure in October 2023 to address challenges identified in the market structure. The similarities and differences in these structures are mainly in whether the structures are organized by military department affiliation, the number of management offices, and the rank of management office leaders. DHA's Market and Network Structures to Manage Medical Facilities Organizational structure Primarily organized by military department affiliation Number of management offices Number and rank of management office leaders Market No 22 7 General or Flag Officers 15 Captains or Colonels Network Yes 9 9 General or Flag Officers Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense and Defense Health Agency (DHA) information. | GAO-25-107432 While DHA has started implementing a network structure, it has not fully determined all the resources it needs. Specifically, DHA determined it needed nine offices to manage its resources under the network structure. However, DHA has not explained to Congress how this structure meets the intent of a statute. For example, DHA is limited to establishing no more than two regions within the continental United States and no more than two regions outside the continental United States to manage its medical facilities. Until DHA provides such information, Congress risks not having reasonable assurance that DHA is implementing an effective organizational structure that, among other things, fully integrates the military departments' medical capabilities and enhances joint medical operations. DHA has not fully determined and validated how many personnel resources are required to manage and support its medical facilities. DHA has not completed these efforts because it has not issued guidance that details the processes needed to determine and validate personnel requirements, including by analyzing workload. Additionally, DHA has not developed a plan to implement such guidance, once issued, for these efforts. Without issuing detailed guidance and developing an implementation plan, DHA lacks the information it needs to establish personnel requirements to accomplish its objectives and track its progress. DHA has not determined how it will consolidate business functions (e.g., clinical quality management and information technology) to save on costs because it has not studied them. DHA has also not developed an implementation plan for consolidating these functions. By studying its functions and developing an implementation plan to track progress in consolidating them, DHA will be better positioned to ensure these functions are structured to manage its medical facilities as efficiently and effectively as possible. Why GAO Did This Study DOD realigned its medical facilities from the military departments to DHA in response to legislative reforms initiated in 2016. These reforms were intended to create a more efficient oversight structure for these facilities that would lower costs while improving care for military service members and eligible beneficiaries. Section 714 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 includes a provision prohibiting DOD from advancing beyond phase one of DHA's plan to establish its network structure until GAO assesses and reports on DHA's transition efforts. Among other objectives, this report 1) describes how plans to manage medical facilities have changed, and 2) assesses the extent to which DHA has determined resources it needs to manage its facilities. GAO reviewed policies, guidance, and other documentation related to DHA's organizational efforts. GAO interviewed DOD and DHA officials, including those from the network structure's nine management offices. GAO also spoke with officials from a nongeneralizable sample of six medical facilities about current and prior organizational structures.

What GAO Found To comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), agencies generally must conduct regulatory flexibility analysis when promulgating a new rule. This analysis assesses the rule's potential impact on small entities and explores alternatives for minimizing the rule's economic impact. Alternatively, agencies may certify that a rule would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and that such analysis is therefore not needed. GAO found that in fiscal years 2022 and 2023, federal agencies published 195 significant final rules (e.g., those with a large annual effect on the economy) that were subject to RFA requirements. Agencies certified in 142 instances (73 percent) that the proposed rule would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. GAO also found that analyses conducted by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Small Business Administration (SBA) generally met statutory requirements. However, the analyses were sometimes inconsistent with recommendations from SBA's Office of Advocacy and key practices from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and GAO for conducting regulatory and economic analysis. For example: Certifications. The certifications GAO reviewed generally met statutory requirements, such as providing a statement of factual basis to support the certification. However, GAO found that several of the analyses supporting the certifications did not include information recommended by Advocacy, such as the rule's potential benefits for small entities or the thresholds used for determining “significant impact” or “substantial number.” Regulatory flexibility analyses. The initial and final regulatory flexibility analyses that GAO reviewed generally met statutory requirements, such as describing and estimating the number of affected small entities. However, the analyses were sometimes inconsistent with recommended practices from Advocacy, OMB, and GAO. For example, some did not disclose their data sources, and none considered the indirect costs of the rule. Fully incorporating Advocacy guidance and other recommended elements into RFA policies and procedures could help CMS (within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)), Energy, and EPA enhance their ability to analyze a rule's economic impact on small entities. Additionally, SBA does not have policies and procedures specific to RFA requirements. Developing such procedures could improve the agency's ability to ensure consistent compliance. Advocacy is charged with providing training to agencies on RFA compliance, but it has not trained 87 of 181 rulemaking agencies since its training program began in 2003. Further, in fiscal years 2019–2023, 26 of the 41 agencies that Advocacy identified as having deficiencies in their RFA analyses did not receive training. Advocacy does not have formal policies and procedures for its RFA training program, such as methods for identifying all rulemaking agencies or targeting those in need of training. By establishing training policies and procedures, Advocacy could better equip agencies to comply with RFA requirements. Why GAO Did This Study RFA was enacted in 1980 in response to concerns about the effect of federal regulations on small entities. SBA's Office of Advocacy provides RFA compliance training to federal agencies. GAO was asked to review agencies' implementation of RFA. This report examines CMS's, Energy's, EPA's, and SBA's RFA analyses for 2022–2023 rules and the extent to which Advocacy has provided RFA training, among other objectives. GAO selected these agencies because they published the greatest numbers of significant final rules and RFA analyses in fiscal years 2022 and 2023. Collectively, they published 30 percent of significant final rules and 36 percent of analyses. GAO reviewed all 55 proposed rules these agencies certified and all 20 rules that contained initial and final regulatory flexibility analyses. GAO compared these rules and agency policies for conducting RFA analyses against RFA requirements and key practices recommended by Advocacy, OMB, and GAO. GAO also reviewed Advocacy's training activities.

What GAO Found The federal government has many existing tools and resources to help agencies combat fraud and improper payments. GAO has recommended improvements in these areas. For example, Congress could make permanent the Social Security Administration's authority to share its full death data with the Department of the Treasury's Do Not Pay system. Programs Reporting the Largest Percentage of Estimated Improper Payments in Fiscal Year 2024 Note: See full report for details of payment estimates. Artificial intelligence (AI) and other innovative technologies have the potential to enhance efforts to combat fraud and improper payments. However, these tools require high-quality data. Introducing insufficient, unrelated, or bad data will make an AI model less reliable. A system that produces errors will also erode trust in the use of AI to detect fraud. GAO's AI Accountability Framework for Federal Agencies and Other Entities includes key practices for ensuring data are high-quality, reliable, and appropriate for the intended purpose. Another potential step, which GAO recommended in 2022, is to establish a permanent analytics center of excellence focused on fraud and improper payments. Should such a center be realized, it is likely that an AI-based tool would be a key component. An AI-ready workforce is another essential requirement if the federal government is to use this tool in the fight against fraud and improper payments. For decades, however, GAO has identified mission-critical gaps in federal workforce skills and expertise in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. More specifically, there is a severe shortage of federal staff with AI expertise. GAO has reported that improvements may be hampered by uncompetitive compensation and the lengthy federal hiring process. Why GAO Did This Study GAO has reported that fraud and improper payments are estimated to have cost taxpayers trillions of dollars. These issues also impact the integrity of federal programs and erode public trust. Improper payments are payments that should not have been made or that were made in the wrong amount. Fraud involves obtaining something of value through willful misrepresentation. The advancement of AI presents both opportunities and challenges for combatting fraud and improper payments in the federal government. This testimony describes 1) actions Congress and agencies can take to combat fraud and improper payments without the use of AI, 2) opportunities and challenges for using AI to combat fraud and improper payments, and 3) workforce challenges in the use of AI in the federal government. For more information, contact Sterling Thomas at ThomasS2@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In its 2025 High Risk List, GAO added building condition as a high-risk topic due in part to large increases in the cost of addressing deferred maintenance in federal buildings. Unless this trend reverses, federal assets will continue to deteriorate and need premature replacement, which can be significantly more expensive than if maintenance and repairs were done when originally scheduled. The Department of Defense and federal civilian building deferred maintenance and repair backlogs have more than doubled, from $171 billion to $370 billion, between fiscal years 2017 and 2024. In March 2025, the General Service Administration (GSA) noted that its deferred maintenance backlog exceeded $17 billion and that addressing this issue was a top priority. U.S. Department of Defense and Federal Civilian Agencies' Reported Estimates of Deferred Maintenance and Repairs, Fiscal Years 2017–2024 As GAO reported in November 2023 (GAO-24-105485), GSA and three other agencies attributed increases in deferred maintenance and repair to factors including funding constraints; rising labor and materials costs; and the size and age of agencies' real property portfolios. GAO recommended steps for the federal agencies to improve how they communicate maintenance and repair needs to Congress and the public. Retaining underused space costs millions of dollars and is one of the main reasons federal real property management has remained on GAO's High-Risk List since 2003. As recommended by GAO in October 2023 (GAO-24-107006), measuring the use of federal buildings and disposing of unneeded ones are essential. Federal agencies could then reduce their deferred maintenance needs because the government would no longer need to repair buildings it does not own. Why GAO Did This Study The federal government owns a massive portfolio of buildings and structures that costs billions of dollars to operate and maintain annually. The government's annual operating and maintenance costs for its 277,000 buildings exceeded $10.3 billion in fiscal year 2023. Deferred maintenance and repair on these assets can affect agencies' abilities to support their missions. Managing federal real property has remained on GAO's High-Risk List for 22 years. GAO added building condition as a high-risk topic within federal real property this year due to large increases in the cost of addressing deferred maintenance. This statement explains why GAO placed building condition on the High-Risk List in 2025 and how the disposal of unneeded facilities could affect maintenance backlogs. It is based on GAO's prior work and reflects GAO's 2025 High-Risk update (GAO-25-107743) .

What GAO Found Appropriations for the Superfund program have generally declined since fiscal year 1999. Specifically, these appropriations declined from about $2.6 billion in fiscal year 1999 to about $537 million in fiscal year 2024. In fiscal year 2023, the Treasury collected $1.44 billion in Superfund taxes, which was available to the program in fiscal year 2024 as it transitioned to a combination of base and tax funding. The Superfund program also received supplemental appropriations in some years. For example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided an additional $600 million in fiscal year 2009, and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act provided an additional $3.5 billion in fiscal year 2022. Superfund Program Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1999–2024 Note: After authority for Superfund taxes expired at the end of 1995, they began to be reinstated in 2021 and take effect in 2022. In fiscal year 2023, the Treasury collected $1.44 billion in Superfund taxes, which was available to the program in fiscal year 2024 as it transitioned to a combination of base and tax funding. As of March 5, 2025, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) National Priorities List (NPL) had 1,340 active sites across the U.S. About 90 percent of these sites are nonfederal. According to prior GAO analyses of EPA data, from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2013, the numbers of new sites added to and deleted from the NPL generally declined. According to EPA officials, the decline in the number of nonfederal sites deleted from the NPL was because of the decline in annual appropriations and the fact that the sites remaining on the NPL were more complex and took more time and money to clean up. In its prior work, GAO identified factors that EPA officials characterized as affecting the timeliness of NPL site cleanups, including the following: Discovery of new contaminants or a change in the extent of contamination. Lack of potentially responsible parties to contribute to cleanup costs. Technical complexity of some sites (e.g., sediment sites). Limited agency resources, such as decreases in funds and regional staff to perform the cleanup. Why GAO Did This Study EPA is responsible for administering the Superfund program to clean up sites contaminated by hazardous substances. EPA lists some of the nation's most seriously contaminated sites on the NPL. Superfund sites include mining sites, landfills, and former manufacturing sites. Sites may include a variety of contaminants, such as polychlorinated biphenyls, lead, and arsenic. EPA may select different types of remedies to clean up these sites. For nonfederal sites, EPA can, for example, carry out the cleanup itself or oversee cleanup conducted by parties responsible for the contamination, known as potentially responsible parties. Cleanups are often expensive and lengthy. Historically, the program received money from sources such as taxes, appropriations, and recoveries from potentially responsible parties. Authority for the taxes expired at the end of 1995 and began to be reinstated in 2021 and take effect in 2022. This statement discusses (1) trends in Superfund program appropriations, (2) numbers of NPL sites and EPA-identified reasons for changes, and (3) factors EPA officials identified as affecting the timeliness of NPL site cleanups. GAO based this statement on its 2009, 2015, and 2016 reports about the Superfund program. Appropriations data presented in the 2015 report were updated for this statement. For more information, contact J. Alfredo Gómez at GomezJ@gao.gov.

In fiscal year 2024, GAO's work yielded over $67.5 billion in financial benefits. Our average return on investment for the past 6 years is $123 for every dollar invested in GAO. In fiscal year 2024, GAO also identified 1,232 programmatic and operational benefits that led to improved services to the American people, strengthened public safety, and spurred improvements across government. Congress routinely uses GAO's work to inform key legislative decisions. For example, based on GAO recommendations, Congress: directed DOD to establish minimum standards for military housing to address poor conditions; required the FAA to develop a strategy to safely integrate drones into the national airspace; and directed the National Nuclear Security Administration to improve cybersecurity practices. GAO's fiscal year 2026 request reflects continued high demand for GAO services. Over the past 4 years, GAO has received, on average, 627 new congressional requests for studies each year, which includes requests from committee leadership and mandates (provisions in legislation and related reports). For example, the latest National Defense Authorization Act and related reports included 95 mandates for GAO; the Water Resources Development Act of 2024 included 26 mandates; and the Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization Act of 2024 included 36 mandates. In addition to conducting work for new mandates, GAO has over 150 mandates that have recurring reporting requirements. For example, GAO performs annual financial audits of the SEC, FDIC, and IRS, among others. GAO also provides an increasing amount of technical assistance to Members and committees. In fiscal year 2024, GAO provided over 1,100 instances of this informal, quick-turnaround assistance. GAO's fiscal year 2026 budget request is for $933.9 million in appropriated funds and $72.2 million in offsetting receipts. GAO's workforce is projected to shrink by 126 employees in fiscal year 2025 due to the full-year continuing resolution. The fiscal year 2026 budget request would allow GAO to build back some, but not all, of this loss. These resources will enable GAO to meet the priority needs of the Congress, including five key areas of importance to the nation and Congress: National Security Enterprise. GAO evaluates an array of national security efforts in areas such as military readiness, major weapons systems acquisitions, space programs, and the U.S. nuclear complex. The size and complexity of these efforts continue to grow; the fiscal year 2025 continuing resolution increased defense spending by $6 billion over fiscal year 2024 enacted levels. Science and Technology. There is growing demand for GAO's science and technology work. GAO has focused on enhancing this area to meet increased demands from Congress. GAO's science and technology team, for example, provided over 90 technical consultations to Congress in 2024 alone. GAO's portfolio of ongoing and future work includes many aspects of artificial intelligence, medical research and applications, critical minerals recovery, and quantum computing. Fraud Prevention. GAO examines government efforts to safeguard programs from fraud by focusing agencies more on prevention. In 2024, GAO estimated the federal government lost between $233 billion and $521 billion annually between fiscal years 2018-2022. Similarly, GAO reported that agencies estimated $162 billion in improper payments in 2024, but this does not represent the full extent of this problem. Cybersecurity. GAO assesses the development and execution of a comprehensive national cybersecurity strategy, the cybersecurity of 16 critical infrastructure sectors across the U.S., and the security of federal information systems. Health Care Costs. GAO examines the sustainability and integrity of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, Veterans Affairs, DOD, and Indian Health Service health care services. The fiscal year 2026 budget request will also allow GAO to address internal operational needs as well as critical projects and initiatives deferred in fiscal year 2025. Specifically, GAO will advance ongoing IT modernization, cloud management, and storage solutions initiatives while also enhancing internal cyber security controls. Additionally, GAO will continue space optimization projects at both our headquarters building and field offices to increase leasable space and address critical building infrastructure enhancements to improve safety, strengthen reliability, and reduce costs. Background GAO's mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO's work spans the full breadth and scope of the federal government's responsibilities. Congress relies on GAO's nonpartisan, objective, and high-quality work to help inform congressional deliberations as well as oversight of the executive branch. GAO routinely conducts work for the Chairs or Ranking Members of over 90 percent of all standing committees. Since fiscal year 2002, GAO's work has resulted in over: $1.45 trillion dollars in financial benefits; and Over 29,000 program and operational benefits that helped to change laws, improve public safety, and promote sound management throughout government. For more information, contact A. Nicole Clowers at CongRel@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The 2021 National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism (Strategy) tasked the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other federal agencies to implement activities to counter domestic terrorism. Agencies have taken steps to implement most of these activities (49 of 58 activities identified by GAO) through both new and preexisting efforts. For example, agencies shared online resources for terrorism prevention with nonfederal partners and the public and updated screening procedures for federal and military personnel. The Strategy also states that nonfederal partners, such as state and local entities, play a role in countering domestic terrorism. The Strategy, however, does not fully address most of the six desirable characteristics that GAO has previously reported comprise an effective national strategy. For example, the Strategy does not include a risk assessment or clarify which federal entity is responsible for oversight. Further, it does not consistently include milestones, performance measures, or resource information. By including such information in the Strategy, or any national strategy, in effect, to combat domestic terrorism, the National Security Council (NSC) could improve how it oversees activities. In turn, this could enable the NSC and relevant agencies to measure progress in meeting goals to successfully address domestic terrorism and enhance public safety. Extent to Which the 2021 National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism Addresses GAO's Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy Federal and nonfederal partners identified challenges related to the Strategy, such as not knowing which agencies were responsible for specific activities. DHS and DOJ, two agencies with statutory missions to combat domestic terrorism and tasked with the most Strategy activities, have shared some details about Strategy implementation, such as providing domestic terrorism-related information on publicly accessible websites. However, they could further clarify their roles and efforts to counter domestic terrorism and communicate such to nonfederal partners to ensure their contributions effectively assist federal efforts. In doing so, DHS and DOJ would be better equipped to address their missions related to countering domestic terrorism. Also, nonfederal partners could better align their resources to support federal efforts. Why GAO Did This Study In June 2021, the White House NSC released a Strategy that aims to provide a framework to address domestic terrorism, which it identified as an urgent priority. The FBI Director testified in December 2023 that domestic terrorism investigations had more than doubled since 2020. GAO was asked to review the Strategy. This report examines, among other things, (1) steps agencies have taken to implement the Strategy, (2) the extent to which the Strategy includes desirable characteristics for an effective national strategy, and (3) challenges identified by federal and nonfederal partners in implementing the Strategy. GAO reviewed the Strategy and related documents, analyzed NSC information, and interviewed officials from eight federal agencies. GAO also interviewed nonfederal partners and Joint Terrorism Task Force personnel in seven geographically dispersed states that had experience with domestic terrorism incidents, as well as 12 domestic terrorism experts.

What GAO Found Drug shortages are a serious public health concern that can adversely affect patients by delaying or limiting access to care. Challenges with the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) oversight of medical products, including drug shortages, led to its inclusion on GAO’s High-Risk List. As of July 31, 2024, there were 102 drug shortages being tracked by FDA. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the number of new drug shortages reported each year has generally decreased, although drug shortages are lasting longer. The types of drugs in shortage generally continued pre-pandemic trends. For example, shortages most commonly affect sterile injectable drugs that are critical to hospital care and cancer treatment. Further, the pandemic exacerbated existing supply chain vulnerabilities that underlie shortages. For example, shortages of a drug used to prevent blood clotting during surgeries were exacerbated by demand increases during the pandemic. This affected patient care in life-threatening situations, according to a patient advocacy group. Duration of Drug Shortages from December 29, 2019, and July 31, 2024 FDA, within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for tracking and addressing drug shortages in the U.S. As such, FDA has several efforts underway to improve how it addresses shortages. For example, FDA has taken steps to develop data analytic tools to help its staff better analyze drug supply chain information and potentially predict possible drug supply disruptions. FDA also started developing an effort to encourage manufacturers to invest in more mature quality systems, as quality issues underlie many shortages. Drug shortages are a multifaceted issue that require a collaborative governmental approach to address them, according to FDA, Congress, and others. However, HHS did not have a coordinating structure across the department to oversee its responses and strategies. This limited the capability of HHS to mitigate and respond to shortages and strengthen supply chain resilience, according to HHS. In November 2023, President Biden announced a coordinator position within HHS to strengthen medical product supply chains and address related shortages. HHS took steps to establish this position. For example, it appointed an acting coordinator that developed a task force that included representatives from agencies across HHS. In responding to GAO's draft report, HHS notified GAO that the coordinator position will end in May 2025, because funding originally designated for these activities will expire. This will leave HHS without a mechanism for coordinating the department's drug shortage activities. The department stated that the current administration had not indicated how it will direct and coordinate supply chain activities moving forward. Given the longstanding nature of this critical public health issue, it is important that HHS identify and implement a mechanism to coordinate its drug shortage activities and collaborate with other federal stakeholders. Once a mechanism is identified, taking into consideration GAO's leading practices for interagency collaboration when developing that mechanism will be critical to ensuring HHS can effectively address drug shortages. GAO's Leading Interagency Collaboration Practices and Selected Key Considerations Why GAO Did This Study Drug shortages arise from a variety of factors that contribute to supply chain vulnerabilities, such as lack of incentives to produce less profitable drugs and to invest in manufacturing quality. While FDA helps respond to and prevent drug shortages, it cannot address some of the economic factors affecting the supply chain like other agencies can, such as by purchasing drugs or funding certain manufacturing. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to report on the federal pandemic response. This report (1) describes the trends in drug shortages since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, (2) describes steps FDA is taking to improve its drug shortage response and prevention efforts, and (3) examines the status of the Supply Chain Resilience and Shortages Coordinator position. GAO analyzed FDA data from 2017 to 2024 to obtain information on drug shortages; identified new efforts that FDA had underway since GAO last reported on the issue in 2016; reviewed relevant FDA documents and guidance; and interviewed officials from HHS and a nongeneralizable sample of 15 organizations representing entities affected by drug shortages, such as manufacturers, patients, and providers.

What GAO Found The full extent of fraud within the pandemic-relief programs will never be known with certainty. The scope of the pandemic-relief response; the inherently deceptive nature of fraudulent activities; and the resources needed for detection, investigation, and prosecution of fraud make it difficult to measure. However, estimates indicate hundreds of billions of dollars in potentially fraudulent payments were disbursed. As of December 31, 2024, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has publicly announced criminal fraud-related charges involving pandemic-relief programs against at least 3,096 defendants—which can be individuals or entities.  Number of Defendants Charged with Criminal Fraud-Related Offenses Involving Pandemic-Relief Programs and Case Status, as of December 31, 2024 aDefendants found guilty of pandemic-related criminal fraud charges have been typically sentenced to prison time and ordered to pay restitution. Their sentencing varied based on the circumstances of the offense, as well as other factors. The number of defendants facing criminal fraud-related charges involving pandemic-relief programs continues to increase, as it takes time for new cases to be identified and developed, and hundreds of investigations are still underway. Additionally, extensions to statutes of limitations may contribute to an increase in cases. In reviewing DOJ case documentation, GAO identified different types of fraud schemes and fraudsters who defrauded at least 19 different pandemic-relief programs. In addition to more traditional and organized criminal groups, entities in a wide variety of sectors, and individuals from all walks of life, defrauded these programs. Although criminal prosecutions serve as a key tool in the mission to address pandemic-relief program fraud and recover stolen funds, civil actions offer the government alternative ways to uncover more fraud schemes and recover assets. According to DOJ, from March 2020 to December 31, 2024, it has secured more than 650 civil settlements and judgments, totaling more than $500 million to resolve allegations of fraud or overpayments in connection with the pandemic-relief programs. Interagency task forces, such as the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force, and the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) were established to combat pandemic-relief program fraud. According to the task force’s 2024 report, civil administrative and civil and criminal judicial cases resulted in the forfeiture of over $1 billion in fraudulent proceeds. In December 2024, the PRAC reported that the PRAC Fraud Task Force efforts have led to criminal charges against 111 subjects and assisted the federal government in recovering over $16 million. Although some individuals might never be swayed from attempting to defraud government programs, agencies can implement deterrence actions—such as emphasizing the consequences of committing fraud and highlighting controls in place—to help prevent future fraudsters. Also, by examining fraudsters and fraud schemes that emerged during the pandemic, agencies can identify fraud mitigation controls that can be implemented in emergency environments and normal operations. GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework identifies leading practices for agencies to better plan for and take a more strategic approach toward managing fraud risks in normal operations but also when responding to emergency situations. In addition, GAO has recommended numerous actions that federal agencies should take to help ensure they are effectively managing fraud risks and preventing as much fraud as possible up front. For example, GAO recommended that agencies use data analytics to better manage fraud risk. Further, GAO has released various reports and insights that may help agencies as they prepare and plan to implement controls and mitigate fraud risks for future emergencies. Considering what was likely lost to fraud during the pandemic, it is crucial for agencies to have effective fraud prevention and deterrence strategies. Why GAO Did This Study Pandemic-relief programs were critical for assuring public health and economic stability. However, they also created unprecedented opportunities for fraud due to the dollars involved and other risk factors. Considering what was likely lost to fraud during the pandemic, assessing what lessons and insights can be taken to better prepare for both normal operations and future emergencies is critical for agencies. Beyond financial impacts, fraud erodes public trust in government and hinders agencies’ efforts to execute their missions and program objectives effectively and efficiently. Therefore, it is important to take steps to prevent fraud from occurring in the first place. While the disbursement of pandemic-relief funds is largely over, the work of investigating, prosecuting, and recovering fraudulently disbursed funds is still ongoing. DOJ and its law enforcement partners continue to prioritize the investigation and prosecution of defendants that committed these offenses. GAO performed this work under the CARES Act that includes a provision for GAO to report on its ongoing monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report provides information on the status of pandemic-relief program cases involving fraud-related charges brought by DOJ and how agencies can enhance fraud prevention. For more information, contact Rebecca Shea at shear@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In February 2024, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) published the Transportation Security Preparedness Plan to Address the Event of a Communicable Disease (TSA preparedness plan), as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (FY 2022 NDAA). The purpose of the plan is to support the protection of the transportation security sector's workforce and maintain essential functions and services. It builds on several planning documents that the agency previously developed to prepare for a communicable disease outbreak. These include the Chemical/Biological and Pandemic Base Plan, TSA's primary plan to prepare for and respond to various health incidents, according to TSA officials. To align its preparedness plan with other federal plans and strategies, TSA reviewed documents, spoke with officials at several federal agencies, and requested feedback from these agencies on a draft of the TSA preparedness plan. According to TSA documents and officials, the agency reviewed approximately 80 documents, including related plans from other federal agencies. GAO also identified examples of how plans to communicate and collaborate in the TSA preparedness plan aligned with similar steps in three federal planning documents. These include plans from the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services as well as the White House's National Biodefense Strategy (national biodefense strategy), as shown in the figure below. Examples of Alignment Between the TSA Preparedness Plan and Three Federal Planning Documents Note: To determine alignment, we reviewed the portions of TSA's plan that relate to communicating and collaborating with the five types of partners required by statute. For more details, see Fig. 3 in GAO-25-107573. The FY 2022 NDAA also required TSA to distribute the TSA preparedness plan to certain partners, including federal departments and agencies, TSA's workforce, and the traveling public. TSA initially did not distribute the plan to all partners identified in the statute. However, in December 2024, TSA acknowledged this oversight in response to GAO's questions and subsequently distributed the plan to all partners. TSA has taken steps to implement the TSA preparedness plan. For example, TSA updated field office planning guidance to include elements of the plan and intends to conduct exercises by the end of 2025, according to officials. Why GAO Did This Study Global connectivity through air and other modes of transportation have facilitated convenient international travel, but also risks speeding up the spread of emerging communicable diseases, such as COVID-19, which led to over a million deaths in the U.S. and cost trillions of dollars. TSA is the primary federal agency with the mission of securing the nation's transportation systems, including air travels. During communicable disease outbreaks, TSA is to also minimize disruptions across these modes of transportation. The FY 2022 NDAA includes a provision for GAO to assess the TSA preparedness plan. This report provides information on the plan, including the extent to which it aligns with other federal plans and strategies and TSA's efforts to distribute and implement the plan. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed TSA documents and compared the TSA preparedness plan to three other federal planning documents, including the White House's National Biodefense Strategy. GAO also interviewed TSA officials from its headquarters and obtained information from TSA field components at four selected airports. For more information, contact Tina Won Sherman at shermant@gao.gov.