In fiscal year 2023, DOD reported total discretionary budget authority of $851.7 billion—about half of the federal government’s discretionary budget authority per the Office of Management and Budget—and total assets of $3.8 trillion. As stated in our April 2023 High Risk report, DOD financial management and business systems modernization face long-standing issues, including ineffective processes, systems, and controls. While DOD has made progress in addressing its financial management challenges, achieving a “clean” audit opinion on its department-wide financial statements has eluded it. The Big Picture In fiscal year (FY) 2023, the Department of Defense (DOD) continued making progress toward its goal to achieve an unmodified (or “clean”) audit opinion, which is when auditors conclude that financial statements are presented fairly in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. For example, the Marine Corps received a clean audit opinion on its FY 2023 financial statements, reflecting significant progress for DOD. However, DOD’s Office of Inspector General issued a disclaimer of opinion on DOD’s department-wide financial statements, meaning it was unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence on which to base an opinion. In May 2023, we reported that the financial statement audit process has been valuable—providing tangible short- and long-term benefits. DOD noted: ➢ Audits have helped identify assets it did not know existed. For example, in FY 2020, the Navy identified and added nearly $2.4 billion of unrecorded inventory, operating materials and supplies, and general equipment to its records. ➢ Audits have improved DOD’s oversight and efficiency in processing financial transactions. For example, in FY 2022, the Air Force identified and corrected approximately $5.2 billion worth of discrepancies in its accounts. ➢ Audits have led to better management of funding obligations. For example, DOD identified $43 million in contract deobligations in 2022, allowing it to reprogram the funds for more immediate needs. What GAO’s Work Shows For FY 2023, along with DOD’s department-wide disclaimer of opinion, DOD’s auditors reported that 18 of 29 components received disclaimers—including the Army, Navy, and Air Force—while 10 of DOD’s components—including the Marine Corps—received clean audit opinions (see table 1). Table 1: Results for DOD Components Undergoing Stand-alone Audits, Fiscal Years (FY) 2023 and 2022 Audit opinion FY 2023 FY 2022 Unmodified or “clean”a 10 9 Qualifiedb 1 1 Disclaimerc 18 16 Totald 29 26 Source: GAO, DOD. | GAO-24-107478Notes: GAO analysis of data from the FY 2023 and 2022 agency financial reports (AFR) of Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Information Systems Agency’s Working Capital Fund, and the DOD Inspector General; the Marine Corps’ FY 2023 AFR; and GAO-23-105784.aAn unmodified (or “clean”) opinion is when the auditor concludes that financial statements are presented fairly in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.bA qualified opinion is when the auditor can express an opinion on the financial statements except for specific areas where material misstatements exist but are not pervasive or where auditors were unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence, but the possible effects are not pervasive.cA disclaimer of opinion is when auditors were unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide an opinion on the financial statements.dThe Marine Corps General Fund was not audited in FY 2022. Also, the number of DOD components undergoing stand-alone audits increased from FY 2022. Auditors also report on identified material weaknesses in internal controls. For FY 2023, DOD’s department-wide auditor reported that DOD had 28 material weaknesses, which increased since 2019 (see fig. 1). A material weakness is a deficiency in internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the entity’s financial statements will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis. Figure 1: Department of Defense (DOD) Material Weaknesses, Fiscal Years 2019 through 2023 Note: GAO analysis of DOD’s fiscal year 2023 agency financial report and GAO-23-105784. Some of the increases in material weaknesses may be due to more of DOD’s components and entities being audited. In May 2023, we recommended that DOD develop a comprehensive plan with detailed procedures for addressing material weaknesses to help DOD reach its goal of achieving a clean audit opinion. DOD reported that for FY 2023, the Secretary of Defense prioritized efforts to address certain widespread material weaknesses, including issues related to Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT). DOD has been unable to reconcile its FBWT accounts—a process similar to reconciling a checkbook to a bank statement. Although the DOD department-wide FBWT material weakness persisted for the 6th straight year in FY 2023, DOD’s auditors reported that certain components had their FBWT material weakness reduced to a significant deficiency (less severe than a material weakness)—the Army’s Working Capital Fund ($3.5 billion FBWT) and the Navy’s General Fund ($219.8 billion FBWT)—or resolved—the Air Force’s General Fund ($184.1 billion FBWT). Challenges and Opportunities As part of the audit process, DOD’s auditors issue notices of findings and recommendations (NFR) that inform DOD of issues identified during the audit. In May 2023, we reported that DOD’s remediation rate for fully resolving NFRs decreased from FY 2019 to 2022 (see fig. 2). According to DOD officials, this is because it initially addressed less-complex issues identified in NFRs; more complex issues can take multiple years to resolve. Figure 2: Department of Defense (DOD) NFR Trends, Fiscal Years 2019 through 2022 Note: GAO analysis of DOD’s fiscal year NFR data from GAO-23-105784. We also tracked GAO financially related open public recommendations targeted to DOD per our Recommendations Database since 2013. The database covers FY 2002 to the present and is updated daily. As of May 28, 2024, for an agency search on “Department of Defense” and a topic search on “Auditing and Financial Management,” 53 recommendations remain open, including nine priority recommendations. Information included in this product was summarized from GAO-16-47, GAO-22-105894, GAO-23-105784, GAO-23-106203, GAO-24-106660, and GAO’s public Recommendations Database, as well as FY 2023 and 2022 agency financial reports (AFR) for DOD, the Defense Information Systems Agency’s Working Capital Fund, and the DOD Inspector General; the FY 2023 Army Annual Financial Report; the FY 2023 AFRs for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps; DODIG-2023-070; and Office of Management and Budget’s Historical Tables (Table 5.6 - Budget Authority for Discretionary Programs). For more information, see: https://www.gao.gov/https://comptroller.defense.gov/ODCFO/afr/https://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/ For more information, contact Asif Khan, Director, Financial Management & Assurance at (202) 512-9869 or KhanA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found According to the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year (FY) 2024 Federal IT Dashboard data, DOD's planned expenditures for 21 selected IT business programs amounted to $9.1 billion from FY 2022 through FY 2024. The four largest programs accounted for just over half of the planned cost of the portfolio (see figure). The Department of Defense's (DOD) Planned Costs for the Four Largest IT Business Programs Compared to the Remaining 17 Selected Programs from Fiscal Year (FY) 2022–FY 2024 For the 21 programs, 70 percent ($6.4 billion) of the total reported cost across the 3 years was for operating and maintaining the systems and 30 percent ($2.7 billion) was for development and modernization. Officials from 15 of the 21 IT business programs reported cost and/or schedule changes since January 2022 (see figure). Selected Department of Defense (DOD) IT Business Programs Reported Cost and Schedule Changes Since January 2022 This included 13 programs that reported cost increases ranging from $0.5 million to $1.3 billion (a median of $163.3 million) and seven that reported schedule delays ranging from 15 months to 36 months (a median of 24 months). Programs reported mixed progress on performance. Programs are required to identify and track a minimum of five metrics covering customer satisfaction, business results, financial performance, and innovation. Of the 21 programs, four reported meeting all performance targets, 10 reported meeting at least one, and one reported meeting none. The remaining six programs did not report. GAO has previously recommended that DOD ensure that such reporting occur. The 10 DOD IT business programs actively developing software reported using recommended Agile and iterative approaches. However, in areas related to tracking customer satisfaction and progress of software development, four of the 10 programs did not use metrics and management tools required by DOD and consistent with GAO's Agile Assessment Guide. As a result, the department risks not having sound information on its Agile software development efforts. Further, while program officials for all 21 programs reported conducting cybersecurity testing and assessments, several programs did not have an approved cybersecurity strategy. In June 2022, GAO had recommended that DOD's Chief Information Officer (CIO) ensure that programs each develop such a strategy. The department concurred with the recommendation and officials stated that they were continuing to follow up with programs that did not have a strategy. Regarding legislative and policy changes, DOD is revising its business systems investment management guidance, modernizing its business enterprise architecture, and adopting zero trust cybersecurity principles. GAO will continue to monitor DOD's efforts to redistribute roles and responsibilities, improve department management of IT investments, and adopt zero trust cybersecurity. Why GAO Did This Study Information technology is critical to the success of DOD's major business functions. These functions include such areas as health care, human capital, financial management, logistics, and contracting. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2019, as amended, includes a provision for GAO to conduct assessments of selected DOD IT programs annually through March 2026. GAO's objectives for this fifth such review were to (1) examine the cost, schedule, and performance of selected DOD IT business programs, (2) assess the extent to which DOD has implemented key software development and cybersecurity practices for selected programs, and (3) describe DOD actions to implement legislative and policy changes that could affect its IT acquisitions. To address the first objective, GAO selected 21 DOD IT business programs, including (1) 20 business programs listed as major IT investments in the department's FY 2024 submission to the Federal IT Dashboard and (2) an additional business program that that had been previously designated as major and continued to have high annual costs. In analyzing the FY 2024 Dashboard data, GAO examined DOD's planned expenditures for these programs from FY 2022 through FY 2024. GAO also administered a questionnaire to the 21 program offices to obtain and analyze information about cost and schedule changes that the programs reported experiencing since January 2022. Further, GAO compared programs' performance metrics data reported on the Dashboard to OMB guidance and met with DOD CIO officials to understand differences in how the data were reported. To address the second objective, the questionnaire also sought information about the programs' software development and cybersecurity practices, including their use and documentation of Agile metrics and development of cybersecurity strategies. GAO compared the responses and documentation against relevant guidance and best practices (e.g. DOD guidance and GAO's Agile Guide) to identify gaps and risks associated with not following the guidance. For programs that did not follow the guidance or demonstrate having documentation, GAO followed up with DOD officials for clarification on reasons why the programs did not do so. For the third objective, GAO reviewed policy, plans, and guidance associated with the department's efforts to reorganize former CMO responsibilities; implement changes to its defense business systems investment management guidance and business enterprise architecture; and adopt zero trust cybersecurity principles. GAO also met with DOD CIO officials to discuss the department's efforts in these areas.

What GAO Found GAO routinely makes 1,200 or more recommendations each year to assist Congress and improve government performance. Many of these recommendations are intended to save money and enhance revenue. Many more are to strengthen national security, enhance public health and safety, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs and operations. They also help Congress refine and create laws framing federal policies across the spectrum of the government's responsibilities. Typically, over 75 percent of GAO's recommendations are implemented. GAO continuously works with Congress and federal agencies to follow up on open recommendations to achieve the intended results. Because GAO makes new recommendations on an ongoing basis, there is always an inventory of open recommendations. As of March 2024, 5,480 GAO recommendations were open. These recommendations cover six categories, as shown in the figure. A subset of these recommendations (about 4 percent) could produce measurable financial benefits between $106 billion and $208 billion through increased revenues or reduced expenditures, according to GAO's simulation. Potential Benefits of Open GAO Recommendations as of March 2024 GAO used a simulation to estimate total potential financial benefits because a lack of data and other factors make it challenging to precisely calculate the total potential financial benefits of each open recommendation. Also, it is difficult to predict how management would use its discretion in implementing the recommendations. More specific estimates exist for a small subset of these recommendations. In its annual report on duplication and cost savings, GAO identified 19 recommendations with potential financial benefits of $1 billion or more, many of which are described in that report (GAO-24-106915). Several are highlighted in the table below. Examples of Open Recommendations with Potential Financial Benefits of $1 Billion or More Open recommendation (GAO report number linked) Potential financial benefits (source) *Medicare Payments by Place of Service: Congress could realize additional financial benefits if it took steps to direct the Secretary of Health and Human Services to equalize payment rates between settings for evaluation and management office visits and other services that the Secretary deems appropriate. (GAO-16-189) $141 billion over 10 years (Congressional Budget Office) COVID-19 Employer Tax Relief: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) should document processes used to address certain compliance risks for COVID-19 employer tax credits and implement additional compliance activities to potentially recapture ineligible claims. (GAO-22-104280) Tens of billions of dollars over 2 years (GAO analysis of IRS data) *Public-Safety Broadband Network: Congress should consider reauthorizing FirstNet, including different options for its placement, and ensure key statutory and contract responsibilities are addressed before current authorities sunset in 2027. (GAO-22-104915) $15 billion over 15 yearsa (GAO analysis of the FirstNet Contract) Student Loan Income-Driven Repayment Plans: The Department of Education should obtain data to verify income information for borrowers reporting zero income on Income-Driven Repayment applications. (GAO-19-347) More than $2 billion over 10 years (Congressional Budget Office) *Department of Energy's Treatment of Hanford's Low-Activity Waste: Congress should consider clarifying two issues, including the Department of Energy's (DOE) authority to determine whether portions of Hanford's tank waste, such as the low-activity tank waste, can be managed as a waste type other than high-level radioactive waste and disposed of outside the state of Washington. (GAO-22-104365) Billions of dollars over 11 years (GAO analysis of DOE data) *Improper Payments and Fraud: Congress should establish a permanent analytic center of excellence to aid the oversight community in identifying improper payments and fraud. (GAO-22-105715) More than $1 billion annually (GAO analysis of agency data) Legend: * = Legislation is likely to be necessary to fully address all matters or recommendations in this topic area.Source: GAO. | GAO-24-107146aIf FirstNet sunsets, it is unclear what will happen to the remaining $15 billion in scheduled annual payments, which FirstNet currently has authority to collect and reinvest. Note: The examples in the table above are based on GAO's body of work on Duplication and Cost Savings (see GAO- 24-106915) and are derived from methodologies and data that can be specific to each recommendation. In contrast, GAO's simulation uses a uniform methodology, based on data from thousands of GAO's realized financial benefits, to estimate the total potential financial benefits from all current open recommendations. Because these methods are not comparable the simulation results will not match the individual estimates of specific recommendations. See appendix I of this report for more details. Some of GAO's recommendations are directed to Congress. As of March 2024, bills introduced in the 117th and 118th Congresses would have fully or partially addressed 103 of the 242 open recommendations GAO has made to Congress (about 43 percent). Why GAO Did This Study Since fiscal year 2002, GAO's work has resulted in over $1.38 trillion in financial benefits. In addition, over 28,000 program and operational benefits have occurred that helped to change laws, improve public safety, and promote sound management throughout government. In fiscal year 2023 alone, GAO's work generated about $70.4 billion in financial benefits. The Senate report accompanying the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2024, included a provision for GAO to provide additional detail on the potential financial benefits associated with open GAO recommendations to federal agencies and matters to Congress. This report updates GAO's previous estimated ranges of potential financial benefits, both in total and for selected agencies and Congress, which could result from implementation of all open GAO recommendations. To estimate ranges of potential financial benefits, GAO developed simulation models using GAO's historical data on recommendations and realized financial benefits. To ensure a sufficient number of open recommendations for each simulation, GAO selected the 10 entities—nine agencies and Congress—with the largest number of open recommendations. GAO identified and mitigated limitations related to using the historical data for the simulation model by testing several alternatives. Actual financial benefits will depend on whether, how, and when recommendations are addressed. For more information, contact Jessica Lucas-Judy at (202) 512-6806 or lucasjudyj@gao.gov or Michael Hoffman at (202) 512-6445 or hoffmanme@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Most housing providers (45 of 60) in GAO's nongeneralizable sample adopted emergency transfer plans for relocating victims of domestic violence or sexual assault (survivors), as required by the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Violence Against Women Act regulation. But these providers—public housing agencies and private property managers under contract with HUD—often did not specify how transfers would take place. Three providers also required survivors to provide additional information in order to be eligible for a transfer (although inconsistent with the regulation), which might delay a transfer approval and put survivors at risk. Challenges to transferring survivors include differing program eligibility requirements based on program objectives, limited coordination among housing providers on vacant units, and a limited number of appropriate units, according to housing providers and interest groups GAO interviewed. To address these challenges, some housing providers said they used strategies such as sharing data on vacant units, prioritizing survivors from waitlists, and streamlining application processes. Example of Potential Challenges in Making Emergency Transfers between HUD-Assisted Housing Programs HUD has planned training and begun monitoring some housing providers on emergency transfers, but opportunities remain to improve oversight in this area. The 2022 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act included multiyear funding for training and technical assistance. In January 2024, the agency established a multiyear training and technical assistance workplan to address needs expressed by housing providers. In 2023, it also began monitoring public housing agencies' compliance with Violence Against Women Act requirements. However, HUD has provided limited written instruction on implementing emergency transfers and inconsistently monitored private property managers with HUD contracts. For example, notices to housing providers did not include direction on coordinating transfers across programs. HUD regional officials noted that reviews of private property managers did not consistently check compliance with Violence Against Women Act requirements, because the review form did not include questions specific to emergency transfers. Without additional instruction and monitoring from HUD, housing providers may struggle to transfer survivors. Why GAO Did This Study Domestic violence and sexual assault can contribute to housing instability. The 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act expanded protections for survivors in HUD-assisted rental housing. The Act was reauthorized in 2022. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 Joint Explanatory Statement, includes a provision for GAO to review housing providers' emergency transfer plans. This report examines (1) the extent to which selected housing providers adopted emergency transfer plans, (2) challenges to and strategies for completing emergency transfers, and (3) HUD's support and oversight of housing providers' efforts. GAO analyzed emergency transfer policies from a nongeneralizable sample of 60 housing providers, randomly selected within size and urban and rural classifications. GAO reviewed HUD policies, procedures, and training related to the 2013 and 2022 reauthorizations and compared HUD's monitoring against relevant regulations and agency policies. GAO also visited three sites and interviewed 20 housing providers and nine interest groups (such as housing industry and survivor advocacy groups).

What GAO Found GAO's audit of the fiscal year 2023 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS) identified control deficiencies in the processes the Department of the Treasury, in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contributed to material weaknesses in internal control that involve the federal government's inability to adequately account for intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities; reasonably assure that the consolidated financial statements are (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities' financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and reasonably assure that the information in the (1) Reconciliations of Net Operating Cost and Budget Deficit and (2) Statements of Changes in Cash Balance from Budget and Other Activities is complete, properly supported, and consistent with the underlying information in the audited entities' financial statements and other financial data. At the completion of GAO's fiscal year 2022 audit, 14 recommendations were open from prior reports related to control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS. During the fiscal year 2023 CFS audit, GAO found that Treasury implemented corrective actions that resolved two deficiencies and three associated recommendations from prior GAO reports; GAO closed these recommendations. As described in appendix I of this report, these corrective actions included enhancing existing procedures and implementing new procedures for considering the aggregate impact, on the reliability of the CFS, of information not obtained from significant component entities' audited financial statements; enhancing procedures for documenting amounts identified through the entity data analysis (EDA) process that do not link directly to the significant component entities' audited financial statements; and developing and implementing procedures for considering the impact on the CFS of amounts identified through the EDA process. While progress was made, 11 of the 14 recommendations remained open as of February 7, 2024, the date of GAO's report on its audit of the fiscal year 2023 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 11 open recommendations from prior years as part of its fiscal year 2024 CFS audit. Why GAO Did This Study The Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of OMB, prepares the Financial Report of the United States Government , which includes the CFS. Since GAO's first audit of the fiscal year 1997 CFS, certain material weaknesses and other limitations on the scope of its work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements. As part of the fiscal year 2023 CFS audit, GAO identified continuing material weaknesses and other control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS. The objective of this report is to provide the status of corrective actions that Treasury, in coordination with OMB, has taken to address GAO's prior recommendations related to the processes used to prepare the CFS that remained open as of the completion of GAO's audit of the fiscal year 2022 CFS.

What GAO Found Bycatch is fish and other marine species that are unintentionally caught or harmed by fishing activities. Fishers try to reduce bycatch with measures that are highly individualized due to the unique interactions among the fish species they are trying to catch, bycatch species, and fishing gear. Such measures can include fishing gear modifications and fishing area closures. Data on bycatch are primarily collected by fisheries observers, who deploy on fishing vessels to count or weigh bycatch. The percentage of fishing trips carrying observers varies widely by fishery, from zero to 100 percent. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) officials reported that differences in observer funding can drive this variation, and that limited funding for observer coverage complicates bycatch data collection in some fisheries, as discussed below. They also reported challenges with recruiting and retaining observers. The process for developing bycatch estimates varies across fisheries. It generally involves extrapolating data from a subset of fishing trips with observers to generate bycatch estimates for a whole fishery. GAO found that developing estimates is more complicated and less reliable for fisheries with fewer observers and more limited data. NMFS and Regional Fishery Management Council officials said they use estimates to inform their management decisions. NMFS, however, has not gathered information from all regions on the resources they need to support observer programs, or communicated this information externally to stakeholders, such as Congress. By doing so, NMFS could ensure that stakeholders are more informed when making resource decisions. Shark Bycatch and Fisheries Observers Working aboard a Fishing Vessel NMFS' efforts to track its performance in reducing and monitoring bycatch do not align with key elements of evidence-based policymaking related to performance management. Specifically, the agency's bycatch reduction implementation plan lacks measurable performance goals. Having an updated plan with measurable goals and a tracking process could help inform agency decision-making. Additionally, NMFS has enhanced its database to compile bycatch estimates but does not have a comprehensive written plan for how it will report the estimates. Developing such a plan could help the agency better monitor bycatch levels, trends, and information gaps, and demonstrate progress over time to internal and external stakeholders. Why GAO Did This Study Bycatch is a complex issue that can threaten the sustainability of fishing communities and ocean ecosystems. Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, NMFS and the councils are to develop conservation and management measures that, among other things, aim to minimize bycatch and bycatch mortality “to the extent practicable.” GAO was asked to review efforts to manage bycatch. This report addresses (1) measures used to reduce bycatch, (2) coverage and funding of fisheries observers, (3) how bycatch estimates are developed and reported, and (4) how NMFS tracks its performance towards reducing and monitoring bycatch. GAO reviewed relevant laws and NMFS policies and documents. GAO interviewed NMFS and council officials and relevant stakeholders, including representatives from the fishing industry and academia. GAO selected five fisheries for a more in-depth review. These fisheries reflect a range of geographic regions, fishing gear types, and key bycatch concerns.

Why This Matters The U.S. is one of the top consumers of textiles in the world, and clothing brands produce approximately twice the amount of clothing today compared to 2 decades ago. Driven by fast fashion—the mass production and consumption of low-cost clothing—consumers are now wearing clothes fewer times before disposing of them. This has significant environmental implications, including discarded clothing being the largest source of household textile waste. Recycling can help divert textile waste from landfills and into useful applications. Key Takeaways Mechanical and chemical textile recycling technologies are limited by a lack of supporting infrastructure. Recycling technologies that preserve textile quality and can separate blended materials are still in development. Obstacles to widespread textile recycling include material suitability, high costs, and environmental considerations. The Technology What is it? Many textiles, including clothing, upholstery, carpets, and similar materials, can be recycled to extend their useful life and reduce waste. Mechanical and chemical recycling can deconstruct and reprocess textiles discarded during the manufacturing process (pre-consumer) or after consumer use (post-consumer). Recycling approaches differ based on the material, and the quality of recycled products can vary. How does it work? Mechanical recycling involves physically deconstructing fibers through methods such as shredding, crushing, or melting, before reprocessing fibers back into yarn. Mechanical processing leads to weaker fibers and lower quality textiles that have limited use, such as furniture stuffing or insulation. Mechanical recycling is most effective for single material textiles (e.g., 100 percent cotton). It is less effective for blended materials because the recycling process further degrades the quality of the resulting material. Chemical recycling reduces textiles to their basic molecular building blocks using chemical solutions, then rebuilds them to produce fibers of similar quality. The required chemical solution differs based on textile material. As a result, current chemical recycling methods are typically not effective for blended materials. Novel approaches using enzymes can separate some blended materials. For example, certain enzymes can separate cotton and polyester fibers at the molecular level. The fibers are then reprocessed into usable material. Fig. 1 Mechanical and Chemical Textile Recycling How mature is it? Mechanical recycling technologies have existed since the Industrial Revolution. However, mechanical textile recycling is limited due to modern challenges such as the extensive use of blended materials. Improved labeling that contains a breadth of details (e.g., composition, production process, and recyclability) could help address this issue but is not widely implemented. Chemical textile recycling is not currently available for widespread use. Such technologies have been successful in the laboratory and small-scale settings. Sorting is an important prerequisite for recycling, but high-speed automated sorting systems are still under development. For example, infrared scanners could identify textile composition to help sort materials. Artificial intelligence and robotics could be used to sort material with high accuracy, but such technologies are not ready for wide-scale implementation. Opportunities Reduce waste. Textile recycling could reduce waste that enters landfills and oceans or is incinerated. This waste sometimes produces microplastics or other substances that can harm the environment and humans. Recycling could also mitigate other environmental consequences of new textile production, affecting areas such as land use, soil erosion, and fossil fuel consumption. Support a circular economy. Some chemical recycling technologies yield high-quality fibers that are indistinguishable from new fibers. This could enable a low-waste system in which few raw materials are needed to recycle or produce textiles. Textile recycling could also shift demand toward new skills related to design, manufacturing, collection, and sorting. Challenges Material complexity. Some materials are difficult to separate and recycle. Finishes and dyes may not easily degrade and can impede recycling. Buttons, zippers, and other parts can disrupt the process and need to be removed. As previously mentioned, blended materials are not suitable for recycling but are present in most clothing. Infrastructure. Current equipment and systems are not suited for high-volume production. Textile collection is difficult to integrate with curbside waste collection because the textiles can mix with other items, making them difficult to recycle. A separate collection option could address this issue but would be logistically complex. Cost. Recycled textiles are more expensive to produce and purchase than those derived from new materials. Environmental considerations. Textile recycling can have fewer negative environmental effects than producing new textiles. However, some technologies require high levels of energy or water consumption. Recycling can be combined with other sustainable approaches that are less resource intensive, such as reusing, repairing, and repurposing textiles, to reduce waste. Policy Context and Questions What standards might help improve the suitability of textiles for recycling? What safeguards should be taken to minimize the environmental hazards of textile recycling? What technological improvements and infrastructure are needed to facilitate widespread textile recycling? Selected GAO Work Advanced Plastic Recycling, GAO-21-105317. Federal Efforts to Advance Recycling, GAO-21-87. Selected References Jeanger P. Juanga-Labayen, et al., “A Review on Textile Recycling Practices and Challenges,”Textiles, vol. 2 (2022), doi: 10.3390/textiles2010010. Damayanti Damayanti et al., “Possibility Routes for Textile Recycling Technology,”Polymers, vol. 13, no. 3834 (2021), doi: 10.3390/polym13213834. For more information, contact Karen L. Howard, PhD at (202) 512-6888 or howardk@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Production Modernization effort consists of eight programs and 16 related and ongoing major projects. These programs and projects are managed by separate offices and are subject to different management requirements. However, NNSA officials told GAO that each program and its associated projects must be integrated to achieve NNSA's modernization goals and that they use established teams and meetings for this purpose as well as schedule and cost information. NNSA's Office of Production Modernization Production Modernization program schedules are insufficient for ensuring the effective integration of programs and their associated major projects. Specifically, NNSA's schedule requirements do not incorporate the 10 best practices for developing reliable and integrated program schedules identified in the Schedule Guide GAO published and that define the characteristics of schedules that support program success. Further, the program schedules GAO reviewed are insufficient for ensuring effective integration because most are not resource-loaded integrated master schedules. Developing such schedules, according to the Schedule Guide, would allow NNSA to better integrate programs' operations with their major projects and other activities that, together, represent one of NNSA's most urgent, complex, and costly efforts. Production Modernization program cost estimates are insufficient for ensuring the effective integration of programs and their associated major projects. Specifically, NNSA's cost estimate requirements do not fully incorporate all 12 steps for developing reliable cost estimates identified in the Cost Guide GAO published. Further, none of the Production Modernization programs have developed cost estimates that cover the full life cycle of program activities. The Cost Guide states that reliable life cycle cost estimates are a key tool for informing decision-making and ensuring that resources are available to support program execution. Developing such estimates would provide NNSA and congressional decision-makers with greater assurance that they have accurate cost information when making critical decisions on how to estimate program budgets and spend the tens of billions of dollars requested to achieve NNSA's modernization goals. Why GAO Did This Study NNSA plans to invest tens of billions of dollars in its decades-long effort to modernize the facilities and infrastructure needed to produce the strategic materials and components required for nuclear weapons. However, NNSA has a history of program management challenges, and recent GAO reports have identified challenges with NNSA's use of program schedules and cost estimates. A committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 includes a provision for GAO to review NNSA's requirements for the integrated planning of the Production Modernization effort. This GAO report (1) describes NNSA's Production Modernization programs and their associated major projects and how NNSA manages them, (2) examines the extent to which NNSA effectively uses schedules to ensure integration, and (3) examines the extent to which NNSA effectively uses cost estimates. Program schedules and cost estimates, among other tools and practices, are essential to help ensure integration. GAO reviewed NNSA's program management requirements for using these tools for eight Production Modernization programs, and interviewed NNSA officials. GAO also assessed agency requirements and practices against best practices GAO has published for using reliable schedules and cost estimates.

What GAO Found The COVID-19 pandemic marked the first time the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) has been used to respond to a nationwide public health emergency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which manages the DRF, used the fund to provide pandemic assistance to individuals and 59 Tribes, states, and territories. Although the DRF received supplemental appropriations in COVID-19 relief legislation, funding requirements for the DRF threatened to exceed available resources by August 2023. In response, FEMA implemented measures to prioritize response and immediate recovery efforts and to pause new DRF obligations that were not essential for lifesaving and life-sustaining activities. As of March 2024, FEMA reported obligations of $125.3 billion from the DRF for COVID-19 assistance, of which $103.6 billion had been expended. Examples of FEMA's COVID-19 assistance include reimbursement for funeral expenses, vaccination and testing sites, and personal protective equipment. FEMA will continue to provide funeral assistance until September 30, 2025. FEMA expects to continue to obligate and expend funds through August 10, 2026, for COVID-19 Public Assistance projects completed during the disaster incident period (January 20, 2020, through May 11, 2023). FEMA estimated that obligations would total $142.2 billion through the end of fiscal year 2024 and $171.6 billion for the entire disaster. FEMA has a process to estimate its obligations for COVID-19 by adding together the amounts it expects to spend for each program across all affected Tribes, states, and territories. FEMA has a goal for its actual obligations to fall within 10 percent of the annual estimate by the end of the fiscal year, for individual disasters and for the DRF overall. However, FEMA did not meet its accuracy goal for COVID-19 in any fiscal year from 2021 through 2023. Although COVID-19 was an unprecedented event, FEMA has yet to identify lessons learned for its estimation processes or methodologies for declared catastrophic disasters based on its experience with COVID-19, nor does it plan to do so. In the future, FEMA may face challenges responding to a catastrophic event that is similar in scope or duration to COVID-19 and that could increase the risk of exceeding DRF resources. By identifying and documenting lessons learned for estimating obligations based on its experience with COVID-19, FEMA can better position itself to adapt to similar estimation challenges in the future. Why GAO Did This Study The joint explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 includes a provision for GAO to evaluate various aspects of FEMA's COVID-19 response. This report examines the status of obligations and expenditures related to COVID-19 and how FEMA estimated these costs. GAO analyzed data from FEMA's financial reports that covered costs incurred for COVID-19 assistance from January 2020 to March 2024 to describe the status of obligations and expenditures. In addition, GAO analyzed FEMA's monthly DRF reports to Congress from June 2020 to March 2024 to compare FEMA's COVID-19 estimates against its actual obligations and assess the accuracy of the estimates. GAO obtained information and perspectives from nine out of the 10 FEMA regional offices, in interviews or in writing, on cost estimation processes and lessons learned. In addition, GAO addressed similar topics through interviews with officials from FEMA's headquarters and selected state emergency managers. GAO selected states representing a range of experiences with natural disasters and effects from COVID-19.

What GAO Found The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) marine operations mission is to support its environmental science and stewardship goals through the operation, maintenance, and modernization of its ships. NOAA's Office of Marine and Aviation Operations (OMAO) plays a central role in enabling NOAA to conduct research, collect data, and carry out various mandates related to oceanography, atmospheric science, climate research, and more. According to OMAO officials, they need to increase the number of NOAA Commissioned Officer Corps (NOAA Corps) officers and civilian professional mariners (professional mariners) to meet NOAA's marine operations mission requirements. NOAA data show that recruitment and retention varied for the NOAA Corps and professional mariners over the last 5 fiscal years, with separations outpacing hiring in some of those years. Factors that affect NOAA mariner recruitment and retention include challenges with work-life balance and pay, among others. OMAO has taken a variety of actions to address recruitment and retention challenges. However, OMAO does not have active workforce plans for the NOAA Corps or professional mariners to guide its efforts to improve mariner recruitment and retention and to expand the size of these mariner workforces. By developing and implementing a workforce planning process, OMAO can ensure that it consistently has active workforce plans. As OMAO develops a workforce planning process, incorporating key principles for effective strategic workforce planning (see figure below) would better position OMAO to grow its mariner workforces and meet mission requirements. Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning Why GAO Did This Study NOAA mariners—which include the NOAA Corps officers as well as professional mariners—operate the nation's largest fleet of federal research and survey ships. This fleet of 15 ships, managed by OMAO, operates worldwide to conduct scientific missions such as nautical charting, fisheries research and surveys, and atmospheric research. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to review issues related to the recruitment and retention of NOAA mariners. This report provides information on the status of recruitment and retention of NOAA mariners, OMAO efforts to address factors that affect mariner recruitment and retention, the extent to which OMAO has implemented strategic workforce planning for its mariner workforce, and other maritime organizations' approaches for recruiting and retaining mariners. GAO reviewed NOAA data on mariner hiring and separations from fiscal years 2019 through 2023 and reviewed documentation of OMAO efforts to improve recruitment and retention among its mariner workforces. In addition, GAO visited two NOAA vessels to observe NOAA mariner working conditions. GAO interviewed OMAO officials, NOAA Corps officers and professional mariners, and representatives of employee groups and unions.

What GAO Found In June 2023, GAO identified 89 priority open recommendations for the Department of Defense (DOD). Since then, DOD has implemented 19 of those recommendations, leading to improvements in sustaining the F-35 aircraft, managing its real property inventory data, and financial reporting, among other areas. Further, GAO removed the priority status from two other recommendations. Thus, reducing the number of remaining priority open recommendations to 68. In June 2024, GAO identified 22 new priority recommendations for DOD, bringing the total number to 90. These recommendations involve the following areas: rebuilding readiness and force structure; accident prevention and safety; cybersecurity and the information environment; acquisitions and contract management; financial management; enterprise-wide business reform; health care; preventing sexual harassment; and strengthening diversity, equity and inclusion. DOD's continued attention to these issues could lead to further improvements in the department's operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015 GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Based on GAO's survey of residential treatment and recovery facilities, an estimated 14 to 33 percent of state-licensed treatment facilities nationwide require residents to work. A higher percentage of certified recovery residences, which Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials said focus primarily on helping residents transition from treatment to day-to-day life, require work (see figure). Of the 35 licensed treatment facilities that reported either requiring or encouraging work, 11 reported that residents might start work immediately after arriving or after completing basic orientation. Among the 44 licensed treatment facilities that reported some of their residents work (e.g., for the facility or an external entity), 13 reported some residents work for no or reduced pay. Estimated Range of the Percentage of Residential Treatment and Recovery Facilities Where Work is Required or Encouraged Notes: Licensed treatment facilities are generally licensed by state agencies. Statistical estimates are generalizable to the nationwide population. Certified recovery residences are generally certified by National Alliance of Recovery Residences (NARR) state affiliates. Statistical estimates are generalizable to the population of certified recovery residences located in states with a NARR affiliate where the state substance misuse agency has contact information for these facilities. Bars shown in the figure represent the range between the lower and upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval. Selected stakeholders that GAO spoke with generally agreed that work can contribute to individuals' successful recovery, and that facilities should consider factors such as the timing of work and adequate pay when incorporating work into substance misuse treatment and recovery programs. HHS has published some informational guidance on the role of work in treatment and recovery. However, four of the five state substance misuse agencies GAO spoke with said additional guidance would be helpful, such as guidance on when best to start work. By developing a process to request and use state agencies' feedback, HHS could better promote effective work arrangements and help state agencies and facilities support residents' recovery. Furthermore, HHS officials told GAO that treatment facilities should not require work as a condition of receiving services. However, HHS' application and related documents for its Substance Use Prevention, Treatment, and Recovery Services (SUPTRS) Block Grant do not clearly provide guidance on work requirements at residential treatment or recovery facilities. Without clarifying guidance, HHS risks block grant funding going to facilities that are not fully in line with its best practices. Why GAO Did This Study Millions of Americans struggle with substance misuse. Some pursue treatment and recovery at over 3,660 residential facilities, according to 2020 HHS data. Some of these facilities may require residents to work. GAO was asked to review work practices at these facilities. This report examines (1) the prevalence of facility work and pay practices, (2) selected stakeholders' views on the role of work in substance misuse treatment and recovery, and (3) the extent to which federal guidance and enforcement address work and pay at facilities. In March to June 2023 GAO surveyed a statistical sample of facilities and obtained generalizable responses from 96 licensed treatment facilities and 48 certified recovery residences. GAO visited facilities, some covertly, selected for geographic variation and other considerations; interviewed HHS and Department of Labor officials and selected stakeholders such as state substance misuse agency officials and researchers; and reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documents.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to eliminate use of aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF)—a product used to fight flammable liquid fires—at its installations. AFFF contains per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), which may have adverse effects on human health, including effects on fetal development, the immune system, and the thyroid. Also, PFAS may cause liver damage and cancer. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 required, in part, that DOD discontinue use of AFFF at its installations after October 1, 2024—with waivers possible until October 1, 2026, and an exemption for shipboard use. The military departments have developed implementation plans, schedules, and costs for replacing AFFF in all land-based mobile assets and facilities worldwide. Further, DOD has developed specifications for the development of a fluorine-free foam that provides a PFAS-free alternative for meeting DOD's fire extinguishing performance standards. Firefighters Train to Extinguish Aircraft Fires The military departments have identified challenges that may affect the time and resources required to fully eliminate AFFF at DOD installations. For example: There are several compatibility issues with qualified fluorine-free foams that preclude them from being drop-in replacements for AFFF for certain tactical firefighting systems, such as their inability to withstand certain temperatures or to be mixed with water in advance of use. There are substantial funding requirements for the transition from AFFF to a fluorine-free product—initial estimates stand at over $2.1 billion. DOD firefighters are not fully trained in use of fluorine-free foams, which differs from use of AFFF. In February 2024, DOD reported to Congress that it anticipates needing to submit the two allowable 1-year waiver requests to the October 1, 2024, statutory deadline—extending some AFFF use at DOD installations to October 1, 2026. The extensions are primarily due to the time it takes to transition systems from AFFF to fluorine-free alternatives without compromising missions or safety. Why GAO Did This Study DOD uses AFFF in about 1,500 facilities and over 6,800 mobile assets worldwide to suppress fires. Release of AFFF into the environment, either through accidental releases, or for fire training and emergency use, has resulted in PFAS detections in drinking water and groundwater in and around DOD installations. In recent years, various statutes have been enacted to limit DOD's use of PFAS-containing materials, including AFFF. GAO was asked to review issues related to DOD's transition to PFAS-free alternatives to AFFF. This included the extent to which DOD has (1) taken action to discontinue use of AFFF at DOD installations and (2) identified challenges that may affect its ability to meet statutory deadlines for discontinuing use of AFFF. GAO reviewed relevant statutes and examined DOD and military department documents and policies related to use of and transition from AFFF. GAO also interviewed officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment; the military departments; and other agencies responsible for implementing the AFFF transition. DOD provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. For more information, contact Alissa H. Czyz at (202) 512-3058 or czyza@gao.gov.

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What GAO Found In May 2023, GAO identified 30 priority recommendations for the Department of Energy (DOE). Since then, DOE has implemented seven of those recommendations by, among other things, taking actions to identify strengths and weaknesses in the energy sector's cybersecurity framework, managing fraud risks, and efforts to better measure project progress to better inform funding decisions. In June 2024, GAO identified four additional priority recommendations for DOE, bringing the total number to 27. These recommendations involve the following areas: improving project, program, and portfolio management; improving contract management; addressing insider threats and cyber security; enhancing energy reliability, security, and resilience; addressing nuclear modernization challenges; reducing DOE's environmental liability; improving financial management; and addressing worker protections. DOE’s continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations. What GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015 GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Mark Gaffigan at (202) 512-3841 or Gaffiganm@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) provides health care to over 9 million beneficiaries—which include service members, retirees, and their eligible family members—through TRICARE. The health care provided includes behavioral health care, which includes treatment for mental health conditions and substance use disorders. TRICARE beneficiaries can receive care at DOD facilities or through networks of civilian providers in TRICARE's East and West regions. The contractors who administer those networks make available an online provider directory in each region to assist beneficiaries in finding care from network providers. These contractors are required to ensure the accuracy of the over 1 million provider listings in the directories and do so through monthly audits of a sample of all provider listings using proprietary methodologies. DOD, in turn, monitors findings from these audits to ensure that network provider listings are accurate per contract requirements. As a result of its monitoring, DOD has identified inaccuracies and directed the contractors to increase the accuracy of their overall directories. However, DOD officials told GAO they do not monitor the accuracy of the combined nearly 130,000 behavioral health provider listings specifically, because they did not expect that there would be differences in accuracy by provider specialty. GAO conducted covert calls to a random sample of behavioral health providers in each directory. Based on the results of the sample, GAO estimates that most of the behavioral health provider listings in the TRICARE network directories are inaccurate. The inaccurate information included the provider's practice location or the provider's phone number, among others. Estimated Inaccuracy of Behavioral Health Provider Listings in TRICARE Network Provider Directories, July-August 2023 GAO's estimated accuracy of these behavioral health provider listings is lower than the contractors' reported accuracy of the overall directories at around 82 percent. Therefore, it may be more difficult for TRICARE beneficiaries to identify in-network behavioral health providers. DOD could do more to identify and address any inaccuracies in the directories and periodically monitor them. Why GAO Did This Study Access to behavioral health care is paramount for TRICARE beneficiaries. Demand for behavioral health care has increased, particularly among active-duty service members and their families. However, inaccurate provider information in the provider directories can hinder beneficiaries' searches for providers. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to examine the accuracy of behavioral health providers' information in the TRICARE directories. This report examines the oversight DOD conducts of the contractors' accuracy of the TRICARE provider directories, including behavioral health provider listings, among other objectives. GAO reviewed documentation, such as listings in the TRICARE provider directories and reports on actions taken by the contractors to improve accuracy. GAO conducted covert calls to a generalizable sample of 342 behavioral health provider listings to assess the accuracy of directory information. GAO also interviewed DOD officials and representatives from the two regional contractors and from beneficiary organizations.

What GAO Found GAO's analysis of the Department of Education's data collected from nearly every U.S. school district found that students' race and ethnicity, gender, and disability status were all prominent with respect to rates of arrest and referrals to police, especially when the characteristics intersected. Specifically, in school year 2017–2018, the most recent year of data prior to the pandemic, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Black, and American Indian/Alaska Native students were arrested at rates that were two to three times higher than White students. For boys who had a disability, the differences in arrest rates widened further. Arrest Rates for K-12 Student Groups Compared to National Average for All K-12 Students, School Year 2017–2018 Note: For more details, see fig. 3 in GAO-24-106294. “With disability” refers to students that receive services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Education's guidance explains that when race, gender, and disability status intersect, students might experience discrimination due to the combination of protected characteristics. Yet, Education does not collect arrest and referral data by race for students receiving services only under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended. Section 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by recipients of federal funding. Education officials said to date, they believe the burden on districts outweighs the benefit; however, they also said they always reevaluate what data they collect and will reconsider collecting such data for the 2025-2026 data collection. Having this data is important; as GAO's analysis shows, the intersection of particular characteristics affects student arrest rates. Also, Education modified the arrest definition for school year 2021–2022, but did not tell districts about the new definition before they collected the data. This raises the risk that districts used the old definition, which could affect data quality. Disclosing data limitations also aids those that use the data. Arrest rates more than doubled in schools with police present compared to similar schools without police, according to GAO's analysis. Among the 51 percent of schools with police present at least once a week, GAO found that arrests were more common when the police were involved in student discipline. Why GAO Did This Study The Departments of Education and Justice are responsible for enforcing certain federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination in K-12 schools based on characteristics such as race, sex, and disability, including regarding police interactions with students. The House committee report for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to review the role of policing in schools, including the effect on students of different races. This report addresses (1) what Education's data show about the extent to which different student groups are arrested in K-12 schools and (2) whether police presence in schools is associated with student arrests. GAO analyzed two federal Education datasets for the two most recent school years before the pandemic (2015–2016 and 2017–2018) and 2019–2020. GAO also visited three school districts, selected for factors such as high rates of arrests; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and interviewed federal officials and representatives of national education and civil rights groups.

What GAO Found The Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management (EM) developed its 2020 Program Management Protocol to update its cleanup policy to reflect leading practices for program management. EM has begun a two-phase review of the implementation of the Protocol at its 15 cleanup sites. Phase I focuses on review and approval of sites' strategic planning, risk management, and life-cycle cost and schedule estimates. Phase II reviews are meant to ensure implementation of the sites' life-cycle scope, cost, and schedule estimates and supporting systems, processes, and procedures is sustainable, and to evaluate the continued reliability of these estimates (see figure). EM's implementation of the Protocol is delayed—initially expected to be completed in fiscal year 2024, it is now likely to extend past August 2025. Office of Environmental Management's Progress in Completing Its Review of the Program Management Protocol Implementation at Its Cleanup Sites, as of April 2024 EM has incorporated some program management leading practices in its implementation of the Protocol and has opportunities to further incorporate others. For example: EM is updating its site-specific life-cycle cost and schedule estimates to use as baselines to track progress and monitor site work by government officials. However, EM does not yet have a comprehensive, program-wide life-cycle schedule estimate—called an integrated master schedule—which is the focal point of program management. EM is planning to update its schedule at the level needed to manage the program, track key decision points and see interdependencies across sites. Until that happens, EM will not be able to integrate and optimize its work to be more efficient and use this schedule as a baseline to monitor progress toward cleanup goals. EM requires cleanup sites to conduct root cause analyses if sites exceed defined thresholds for cost and schedule overruns and secure EM leadership approval for revised estimates. However, EM does not clearly require that corrective action plans accompany the root cause analyses, that the corrective actions are tracked through their completion, or that the implementation of corrective action is independently reviewed. EM is also not required to report on the root causes and the status of implementing corrective actions to ensure corrective actions are implemented in a timely and adequate manner. These steps would create an important accountability and oversight mechanism for a program approaching $900 billion in estimated life-cycle costs. Why GAO Did This Study EM has spent over $215 billion since its creation in 1989 to clean up hazardous and radioactive waste at sites and facilities contaminated from nuclear weapons production and nuclear energy research. EM has acknowledged that it needs to strengthen program management to ensure that the completion of the remaining cleanup work is safe, efficient, and cost-effective. GAO was asked to review EM's implementation of its 2020 Program Management Protocol. This report examines (1) how EM has implemented its Protocol and (2) the extent to which EM has incorporated program management leading practices as it implements the Protocol. GAO reviewed documents and conducted semi-structured interviews with EM officials at cleanup sites and headquarters. GAO also evaluated EM processes against program management leading practices and additional supplemental criteria.

What GAO Found The U.S. Forest Service plans to increase its use of prescribed fire—deliberate burning in specific areas under managed conditions—to mitigate wildfire risk. The agency reviewed its prescribed fire program in 2022 and recommended reforms to enhance the program's safety. Since then, the agency has implemented some of the reforms and taken steps to address others. In undertaking these reforms, the Forest Service generally followed the leading practice for involving employees and key stakeholders, and partially followed four other selected leading practices, leaving gaps. Extent to Which the Forest Service Has Followed Selected Leading Practices for Effective Agency Reforms Practice Extent followed Establishing goals and outcomes ◒ Involving employees and key stakeholders ● Strategic workforce planning ◒ Managing and monitoring ◒ Leadership focus and attention ◒ ● Generally followed—addressed most or all aspects of the selected key questions GAO examined for this practice ◒ Partially followed—addressed some, but not most, aspects of the selected key questions GAO examined for this practice ○ Not followed—did not address the selected key questions GAO examined for this practice Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service documents and interviews with Forest Service officials and stakeholders. | GAO-24-106239 Specifically, GAO identified gaps in these areas: Establishing goals and outcomes. The agency has ongoing efforts to develop outcome-oriented performance measures and goals, such as reducing risk in areas most susceptible to wildfire damage, but has struggled for years to develop these measures and goals, which are critical for evaluating success. Strategic workforce planning. One official told GAO the agency formed a committee in 2024 to help address challenges with maintaining adequate and trained staff. However, the official noted that the effort is in its infancy and did not provide details, documentation, or a time frame for completing the plan. Managing and monitoring. The agency has established time frames and is tracking progress for some reforms it identified for its program, such as expanding training and developing a resource mobilization strategy. However, it does not have an implementation plan that outlines next steps and future milestones for other reforms it intends to undertake. Leadership focus and attention. The Chief of the Forest Service has consistently articulated the need to reform the agency's prescribed fire program, but the agency risks not dedicating sufficient staff resources for day-to-day management of reform efforts. According to agency documents, the Forest Service recognizes the reforms it is making will require major changes to agency practices and culture. By fully following leading practices, the Forest Service would have better assurance that its efforts to safely expand its use of prescribed fire will succeed. Why GAO Did This Study Wildfire severity has increased across the U.S., causing loss of life and property and damage to ecosystems. To mitigate wildfire risk and improve forest health, the Forest Service uses prescribed fire to reduce fuels. The agency reports that less than 1 percent of prescribed fires escape control and become wildfires, but escapes can have significant effects. GAO was asked to review the Forest Service's efforts to improve its prescribed fire program following two escapes in New Mexico in 2022. This report addresses, among other things, (1) steps the agency has taken to reform its prescribed fire program and (2) the extent to which it has followed selected leading practices for effective agency reforms. GAO reviewed relevant Forest Service documents; interviewed officials from agency headquarters, regional offices, and national forests; interviewed stakeholders and Tribes; and conducted in-person site visits and interviews in Idaho and New Mexico.