What GAO Found Under the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, federal agencies can, in certain circumstances, exercise the authority known as march-in rights when an invention that arose from federally funded research is involved. March-in-rights entail an agency requiring a recipient of its funding to issue a license to a third party to develop the invention. Agencies have never exercised march-in rights. In December 2023, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published draft guidance that sought to clarify when agencies could exercise this authority. It proposed using the price of a product resulting from a federally funded invention as a factor for exercising march-in rights. According to the guidance, price could be used under two of the four statutory criteria: practical application and health or safety need (see figure). The draft guidance was developed through a NIST-led interagency process. As of December 2025, NIST did not have a timeline for finalizing the guidance, citing a lack of interagency consensus. NIST Draft Guidance Proposed Using Price as a Factor Under Two Statutory Criteria for Exercising March-In Rights Among the 51,762 public comments on the draft guidance, more than 47,000 comments (about 91 percent) expressed support for the draft guidance, with the remainder expressing opposition. Most comments in favor of the guidance expressed concern about high prescription drug prices and support for using march-in rights to lower them. Comments opposing the guidance—including all comments submitted by universities—raised concerns about potential adverse effects, such as reducing universities’ ability to license inventions and businesses’ ability to attract investment to develop the inventions into products. Because march-in rights have never been exercised, it is only possible to discuss hypothetical impacts of implementing the draft guidance. A federal agency could exercise march-in rights based on product price only if a product resulting from a federally funded invention has an unexpired patent subject to Bayh-Dole. Therefore, the potential for march-in is higher for technologies with a high volume of patenting activity arising from federally funded research, such as pharmaceuticals, computer technology, and electrical machinery. Although most public comments on the draft guidance expressed support for using march-in rights to lower drug prices, studies estimate that march-in based on price would likely affect a small number of drugs. This is because most drugs have patents that are not subject to Bayh-Dole. Why GAO Did This Study Federal agencies fund universities and other organizations to conduct research, which can lead to new inventions. Under the Bayh-Dole Act, recipients of federal funding can retain patent rights to the inventions and license them to other parties. To protect public interest in these inventions, the act allows federal agencies to retain certain rights, including march-in rights. These permit an agency to require a recipient to issue a license to a third party, when the circumstances meet at least one of four criteria specified in the act. If the recipient refuses, the agency itself can grant a license. Agencies can initiate march-in proceedings on their own or in response to requests from external parties. Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, agencies have received about a dozen march-in requests; most of these addressed lowering the price of drugs or other medical technologies. For all the requests, agencies declined to exercise march-in rights. GAO was asked to review development of NIST’s draft guidance and its potential impacts. This report examines: (1) key elements of the draft guidance and the NIST-led interagency process for developing it; (2) stakeholder views on the draft guidance, as reflected in public comments; and (3) available information about the potential impacts of exercising march-in rights based on price. GAO reviewed applicable laws and regulations, analyzed public comments and patent data, reviewed studies estimating how many drugs could be affected by exercising march-in rights based on price, and interviewed agency officials. For more information, contact Candice N. Wright at wrightc@gao.gov.

What GAO Found With few exceptions, in states subject to Public Law 280 (P.L. 280), Tribes share criminal jurisdiction with the state, rather than the federal government, when a tribal citizen commits a crime or, in certain circumstances, is the victim of a crime in Indian country. However, P.L. 280 currently has limited effect on criminal jurisdiction in Alaska—a mandatory P.L. 280 state—because the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 eliminated most of the state’s Indian country. Nevertheless, Tribes in Alaska have inherent authority to exercise certain criminal jurisdiction which, due to other laws, is concurrent with the state. While Alaska and Department of Justice (DOJ) officials had consistent views, officials from the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) shared varying views on this concurrent jurisdiction during GAO’s review. By documenting BIA’s position on concurrent criminal jurisdiction in Alaska and making it readily available, BIA may help ensure consistent understanding of the authority of Tribes in Alaska. Alaska’s status as a mandatory P.L. 280 state may affect Tribes’ access to certain federal public safety and justice funding. Specifically, BIA data for fiscal years 2017 through 2021 (the most recent data available) showed that Tribes in Alaska and other mandatory P.L. 280 states received less funding than Tribes in all other states in the lower 48. Officials stated that BIA has limited discretionary funding and generally must continue to fund Tribes with existing funding agreements for public safety and justice programs at the same level as the prior year. When new discretionary funding is available, BIA officials stated they generally prioritize this funding for Tribes that do not receive public safety and justice services from their respective states. However, BIA has not documented criteria for entering into new funding agreements with Tribes for the first time. By doing so, BIA could provide greater transparency on funding decisions, particularly if Congress appropriates additional funding. BIA Public Safety and Justice Estimated Needs and Expenditures to Federally Recognized Tribes and Tribal Organizations, Fiscal Year 2017 Through 2021 Tribes by P.L. 280 status Tribal needs estimate BIA expenditures Alaska (Mandatory P.L. 280) $3,046,624,000 $59,519,000 Mandatory P.L. 280 states in the lower 48 $2,827,096,000 $151,738,000 All other states in the lower 48 $8,695,641,000 $1,864,373,000 Source: GAO analysis of Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Tribal Law and Order Act reports for fiscal years 2017 through 2021. | GAO-26-107533 Tribal leaders, Alaska Native community members, as well as federal and state officials identified numerous challenges related to public safety and justice in Alaska Native communities. In general, these challenges included high crime rates and limited public safety infrastructure, funding resources, and training. Federal, state, and tribal officials identified various efforts to improve public safety and justice in Alaska, including state-tribal wellness courts. Why GAO Did This Study In 1953, P.L. 280 rescinded most federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian country in certain states and provided it to these select states. As of January 2026, this affects approximately 65 percent of the 575 federally recognized Tribes, including Alaska—a state with one of the highest crime rates in the U.S.. Following the passage of subsequent federal legislation, some uncertainty has been raised about the extent to which P.L. 280 is applicable in the state of Alaska. GAO was asked to review P.L. 280’s effect on public safety and justice on Alaska Native communities.This report addresses (1) the extent to which P.L. 280 affects criminal jurisdiction in Alaska; (2) the effects of P.L.280 on Tribes in Alaska; and (3) views on public safety and criminal justice challenges in Alaska. Among other methods, GAO analyzed relevant laws and federal memoranda on tribal jurisdiction in Alaska, as well as federal crime and funding data for fiscal years 2017 through 2024. GAO interviewed BIA and DOJ officials, as well as non-governmental stakeholders. GAO conducted listening sessions with a non-generalizable sample of over 50 tribal leaders and Alaska Native community members.

Our prior work on the Sentinel program and the Air Force’s planning for the transition from Minuteman III to Sentinel revealed multiple challenges and opportunities. Air Force’s Current and Future Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Systems Our key findings on the Sentinel program include the following: Opportunities during restructuring. As a result of the Nunn-McCurdy breach, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment rescinded Sentinel’s Milestone B approval and related program baselines. Milestone B approval is a decision allowing major defense acquisition programs to enter into system development and demonstration prior to production and deployment. The Air Force is restructuring the program as it proceeds toward obtaining new Milestone B approval. The program’s first flight of the Sentinel missile has slipped about 4 years from original estimates and is now planned to occur in March 2028. However, the breach has provided the Air Force the opportunity to address fundamental issues with the program, including resolving issues with key design tools and performance requirements and finalizing the launch facility design. Future program outcomes will depend on the extent to which the Air Force takes advantage of this opportunity to correct earlier missteps. Major Events in the Sentinel System Development Options to lower costs and arrest delays. Sentinel program officials continue to evaluate options to potentially redesign portions of the weapon system for cost reductions and are looking at avenues to minimize further schedule delays. For example, the Air Force is reevaluating system requirements and evaluating changes to the acquisition strategy—both of which could limit further cost and schedule growth. Software risks. Sentinel is software-intensive, and development progress remains slower than anticipated. These delays have raised concerns from program officials about the prime contractor’s ability to complete the program’s software in a timely manner. Software risks remain because, notwithstanding how long the program has been in development, the Air Force and Sentinel contractor have yet to finalize software design or software development metrics, and are replanning the delivery schedule. Benefits of the new system. Sentinel program officials expect that Sentinel will provide the nation with a significantly more capable ICBM system with modular capacity to adapt as threats and technology evolve. Further, officials stated that the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense are actively mitigating risks to ensure there are no capability gaps during the Minuteman III to Sentinel transition. Our key findings from our 2025 report on the Air Force’s planning for the transition to Sentinel while concurrently operating Minuteman III include the following: Opportunity to improve risk management. The transition from Minuteman III to Sentinel involves a complex, total weapon system replacement. But the Air Force hasn’t developed a risk management plan for the most complex project the service has ever undertaken. A very large project that costs $1 billion or more, affects 1 million or more people, and runs for years may be referred to as a megaproject. Megaprojects are extremely risky ventures, notoriously difficult to manage, and often fail to achieve their original objectives. Research has found that planners can better position a megaproject for success by investing appropriate time at the front end to develop the tools and processes to identify and manage risks. Components of the Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System Sustainment risks for Minuteman III. As a result of delays to Sentinel, the Air Force may need to operate Minuteman III through 2050, 14 years longer than planned. Prolonged operation of the aging system presents sustainment risks. Addressing these risks in a transition risk management plan would help ensure the system meets requirements during the transition. Flight testing risks for Minuteman III. Sentinel delays also mean the Air Force will need to carefully manage the supply of parts for Minuteman III flight testing. The Minuteman III program conducts multiple flight tests per year to provide confidence in weapon system performance. The Air Force will need sufficient time to ensure the necessary parts are available for prolonged testing. A coordinated ICBM flight test plan would enable the Air Force to determine the quantity and type of parts the service needs to be able to test Minuteman III for another 2 decades. Training for Air Force security forces. DOD will need to complete Sentinel launch facility test and evaluation activities early in the transition to inform DOD and Air Force security policy updates. Because security forces incorporate these updates into unit-level operating instructions, these policy updates will be needed to train Air Force security forces for the transition. The Big Picture The Air Force aims to replace the 50-year-old Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system, part of the nation’s strategic nuclear deterrent, with the new and upgraded Sentinel system. But Sentinel is years behind schedule and proving far costlier than expected. In 2024, the Air Force notified Congress that the Sentinel program had breached a statutory cost growth threshold—known as a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach—which triggered a statutorily required review process. The Nunn-McCurdy statute is a tool for Congress to use to hold the Defense Department (DOD) accountable for unit cost growth on major defense acquisition programs. The Air Force is restructuring the Sentinel program to try and improve affordability. The Air Force estimated that the program would cost at least $141 billion, but the actual costs remain uncertain. Sentinel delays mean the Air Force will need to operate the aging Minuteman III longer than planned. The Minuteman III system consists of more than 600 facilities across five states including missile silos and command bunkers, all of which must be replaced. Air Force leadership has described this megaproject as the most significant and complex infrastructure project in the service’s history. Sound planning will be essential for the Air Force to successfully manage a project of this scale while meeting round-the-clock nuclear deterrent requirements. Challenges and Opportunities DOD and the Air Force are working to restructure the Sentinel program to ensure the program meets cost, schedule, and performance requirements. While working to obtain new Milestone B approval, the Air Force has the opportunity to correct program deficiencies that led to the 2024 Nunn-McCurdy unit costs breach, including by developing an integrated master schedule, maturing software development tools and processes, and finalizing the design of the Sentinel launch facility. The Air Force can also use the Sentinel program’s restructuring period to bolster its project management framework, as we recommended, to better position the service for a successful transition from Minuteman III to Sentinel. Key recommendations from our 2025 report on the transition: ➢ The Air Force should develop a transition risk management plan, including a plan to address Minuteman III sustainment risks. ➢ The Air Force should expeditiously develop a post-2030 Minuteman III operational test launch plan that is aligned with a Sentinel fielding plan. ➢ The Air Force should develop a plan to complete the necessary Sentinel launch facility test and evaluation activities that will inform DOD security policy updates. For more information, contact Joseph W. Kirschbaum at KirschbaumJ@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Air cargo volume handled by Puerto Rico’s three international airports fluctuated between 2015 and 2024, hitting a low of 501 million pounds in 2019 before increasing to 621 million pounds in 2024, according to Bureau of Transportation Statistics’s air carrier data. The largest of these airports, Luis Muñoz Marín in San Juan, increased cargo volumes over this period, while volumes declined at the second largest airport, Rafael Hernández in Aguadilla. Mercedita Airport in Ponce is not regularly used as a cargo airport. Health care-related goods—including pharmaceuticals and medical devices—accounted for about half of the reported cargo volume leaving Puerto Rico, according to Census trade data. Air Cargo Traffic for International Airports in Puerto Rico (in pounds), 2015–2024 Note: Data do not include traffic between Puerto Rico’s airports. Mercedita International Airport, which annually handled between 0 and 50,000 pounds of cargo, is included in the total but not separately. According to air cargo stakeholders GAO interviewed, some conditions at Puerto Rico’s international airports can support existing air cargo operations, but improvements are needed for growth. Stakeholders noted recent improvements to airport infrastructure in San Juan, including expanding access roads. However, they also identified additional improvements needed, such as enhancing warehouses and cold storage space at all airports. They also identified needed operational improvements. For example, agency officials, including from U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Agriculture, noted that there were limited staff available to inspect cargo, which could affect timeliness should operations increase. Puerto Rico has pursued several initiatives to promote growth in air cargo operations, including seeking expanded authority for some air carriers to transfer cargo. In addition, Puerto Rico has developed an air cargo strategy and worked with health care manufacturers and the logistics sector to increase collaboration and standardize pharmaceutical handling practices at its international airports. Why GAO Did This Study Aviation is critical for delivering time-sensitive goods like health care products. With the growth of e-commerce, it is also a means to rapidly deliver consumer goods. Puerto Rico is promoting air cargo operations as a means of increasing economic development. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 includes a provision for GAO to study air cargo operations in Puerto Rico. This report describes (1) trends in air cargo operations from 2015 through 2024 at Puerto Rico’s three international airports, (2) conditions at these airports to support air cargo operations and improvements needed for growth, and (3) government and industry efforts to promote air cargo growth and potential effects of such growth. GAO analyzed Bureau of Transportation Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau air cargo data. GAO also interviewed officials from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Transportation; interviewed Puerto Rico government officials, including airport officials at Puerto Rico’s three international airports; and reviewed associated documents from these entities. GAO also interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 29 air cargo stakeholders, including air carriers and health care manufacturers with perspectives on air cargo operations and infrastructure at Puerto Rico’s airports. GAO observed air cargo operations and infrastructure conditions in Puerto Rico. For more information, contact Danielle Giese at giesed@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided significant supplemental funding for Tribes and programs that serve Tribes. As of December 19, 2025, the Bureau of Indian Affairs—under Indian Affairs in the Department of the Interior—had 143 IRA-funded projects totaling about $360 million to support tribal electrification, community resilience, and fish hatcheries across its 12 regions. However, per an executive order, some funds were paused for disbursement in January 2025. This led to schedule delays and potential cost increases for projects, impacting Tribes, according to officials and tribal representatives we interviewed. In December 2025, Interior was conducting a review of all active IRA-funded projects to ensure alignment with administration priorities, according to communications we reviewed. Status of Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) Project Awards by Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Region, as of Dec. 19, 2025 In millions of dollars BIA region Total amount in IRA project awards (number of projects) Total amount initially paused as of Mar. 3, 2025 (percent of total awarded) Total amount obligated but not yet expended as of Dec. 19, 2025 (percent of total awarded) Total amount not yet obligated as of Dec. 19, 2025 (percent of total awarded) Alaska 119.9 (39 projects) 98.0 (82%) 39.1 (33%) 39.6 (33%) Eastern 20.0 (8 projects) 13.2 (66%) 5.1 (25%) 0.0 (0%) Eastern Oklahoma 10.9 (3 projects) 6.7 (62%) 2.8 (26%) 0.0 (0%) Great Plains 25.5 (11 projects) 8.6 (34%) 5.5 (22%) 0.5 (2%) Midwest 30.2 (9 projects) 25.9 (86%) 10.7 (35%) 5.8 (19%) Navajo 17.8 (3 projects) 17.4 (98%) 8.7 (49%) 0.0 (0%) Northwest 43.3 (34 projects) 11.6 (27%) 4.5 (10%) 5.9 (14%) Pacific 31.2 (19 projects) 21.8 (70%) 4.0 (13%) 12.6 (40%) Rocky Mountain 12.4 (3 projects) 2.2 (18%) 0 (0%) 0.0 (0%) Southern Plains 11.2 (3 projects) 1.5 (13%) 0 (0%) 1.5 (13%) Southwest 19.5 (4 projects) 14.7 (76%) 11.9 (61%) 0.0 (0%) Western 17.6 (7 projects) 7.3 (42%) 1.6 (9%) 5.0 (28%) Total 359.5 (143 projects) 229.0 (64%) 93.8 (26%) 70.9 (20%) Source: GAO analysis of data from the Department of the Interior’s Indian Affairs. | GAO-26-107940 Note: Amounts are for specific projects and do not include funds for administrative costs or funds not allocated to a specific region. Numbers may not sum to totals because of rounding. Amounts paused as of March 3, 2025, refer to amounts paused after Executive Order 14154 of January 20, 2025, “Unleashing American Energy,” 90 Fed. Reg. 8353 (Jan. 29, 2025). According to BIA officials, previously obligated funds were later released in response to an April 2025 court order. Amounts not yet obligated prior to the executive order were placed under review but could be released on a case-by-case basis, according to officials. As of December 16, 2025, Interior was conducting an expanded review of all active IRA project awards to ensure alignment with administration priorities, according to communications we reviewed. Federal regional officials told GAO that IRA implementation increased overall workload and exacerbated existing regional workforce capacity challenges, impacting their ability to meet overall workload demands. For example, some regions faced competing priorities and assigned staff outside their area of expertise to implement IRA programs. Additionally, IRA implementation took place in the context of longstanding workforce capacity challenges, such as extended vacancies and a limited talent pool for hiring. Indian Affairs’ regional workforce has experienced varying degrees of attrition since fiscal year 2022, when the IRA was enacted. On average, Indian Affairs’ regional offices had a 10 percent annual staff attrition rate from fiscal year 2022 through fiscal year 2024. In fiscal year 2025, several changes to Indian Affairs’ workforce policies and staffing took place as part of government-wide efforts to downsize and restructure the federal workforce. These staffing changes were expected to reduce the regional workforce by at least 23 percent from the beginning of fiscal year 2025 through December 31, 2025, according to GAO’s analysis. Indian Affairs has taken actions to help meet IRA and overall workload demands, including authorizing overtime, using contractors, and increasing the number of officials certified to award funding to Tribes. However, officials and tribal representatives GAO interviewed identified opportunities for further actions to streamline existing policies, processes, systems, and requirements to reduce administrative burden for Indian Affairs staff and Tribes. Systematically identifying and assessing such opportunities, and developing a comprehensive plan to implement them, could enable the agency to better meet regional workload demands and support Tribes. Additionally, GAO found that assessing Tribes’ technical assistance needs and formally assessing the resources necessary for technical assistance to support expanded use of self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts—which create flexibilities for Tribes to administer federally funded programs—could help reduce regional workload to support long-term tribal development and resilience. Why GAO Did This Study The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) provided $385 million to the Bureau of Indian Affairs for programs serving Tribes. Indian Affairs’ 12 regional offices provide services directly to Tribes or funding for tribally administered programs, including natural resources, real estate services, transportation, and tribal services. In November 2024, GAO reported that components implementing IRA programs in Indian Affairs’ Central Offices experienced increased workload that exacerbated existing capacity challenges, making meeting mission needs difficult across competing priorities. The IRA includes a provision for GAO to support oversight of the distribution and use of IRA funds. This report addresses IRA implementation in Indian Affairs’ regional offices, regional workforce capacity since the IRA was enacted, and opportunities to meet overall regional workload demands to support Tribes.

What GAO Found State and local government recipients of the Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) program had obligated nearly all of their SLFRF awards, as of March 31, 2025—the most recent data available at the time of this review. The data include information received by Treasury through September 30, 2025. Specifically, states reported obligating all but $10.4 million of the $195.8 billion they received, and localities reported obligating all but $101 million of the $127.8 billion in awards they received. State and local government recipients generally had until December 31, 2024, to obligate the SLFRF awards they received. Funds that have not been obligated by that date generally must be returned to Treasury. Between March and October 2025, Treasury sent instructions to the state and local recipients that reported unobligated funds, requesting the return of those funds. As of November 2025, states and localities had returned $13.7 million of the total reported $111.4 million in unobligated funds. Further, states reported spending 80 percent ($156.3 billion) of their SLFRF awards, and localities reported spending 84 percent ($107.2 billion) of their awards as of March 31, 2025. Reported Spending of Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) by States and the District of Columbia, as of March 31, 2025 Both states and localities reported spending most of their SLFRF awards—53 percent ($82.6 billion) and 67 percent ($71.9 billion), respectively—to replace revenue lost due to the pandemic. States and localities generally have until December 31, 2026, to spend their awards. Why GAO Did This Study Overall, SLFRF allocated $350 billion to tribal governments, states, the District of Columbia, local governments, and U.S. territories to help cover a broad range of costs stemming from the health and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. SLFRF recipients must regularly submit reports to Treasury on their use of SLFRF awards and the projects undertaken with them. The CARES Act includes a provision for GAO to monitor the use of federal funds to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. This report examines the SLFRF funding states and localities are required to report to Treasury. This report updates our October 2023, April 2024, and September 2024 reports on states’ and localities’ spending and uses of SLFRF. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed Treasury SLFRF project and expenditure data and interviewed Treasury officials. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations governing the SLFRF program and Treasury SLFRF program guidance, policies, and procedures. For more information, contact Jeff Arkin at arkinj@gao.gov.  

What GAO Found The Army, Navy, and Air Force have issued guidance to help facilitate command efforts to locate a service member who is deemed absent from their assigned duty location. However, the Marine Corps has not developed such guidance, as GAO recommended in 2022. GAO analyzed Army, Navy, and Air Force guidance and identified the following gaps that could hinder efforts to locate absent service members and mitigate related risks. Response time frames. Service guidance outlines response time frames with varying levels of specificity, resulting in different interpretations among officials regarding how quickly certain actions should be initiated. For example, Army guidance includes detailed time frames for actions such as alerting law enforcement, whereas Navy and Air Force guidance does not. Mental health. Army, Navy, and Air Force officials GAO interviewed commonly observed a link between service member absences and mental health and said that locating service members often intersects with efforts to prevent self-harm. However, guidance inconsistently addresses the interconnected nature of mental health issues and service member absences, and how such considerations should inform the command’s response. Safety. Army, Navy, and Air Force officials identified potential safety issues that may arise while searching for an absent service member, especially if the service member is experiencing a mental health crisis or has access to a firearm. However, guidance does not address these safety issues, potentially subjecting the absent service member or those trying to locate them to unnecessary risk. By addressing these gaps in guidance, the services can better position themselves to help prevent harm and save lives. Some services’ guidance for commanders and the military criminal investigative organizations (MCIO) lacks clarity on whether and when to classify an absence as voluntary or involuntary, which can significantly affect the urgency and comprehensiveness of search efforts. For example, Army guidance for commanders requires them to presume the service member is potentially in danger and to presume the absence is most likely involuntary after 48 hours unless available information indicates the absence should be considered voluntary. However, Department of Defense (DOD)-wide guidance does not have a similar provision, nor do the other military services’ guidance. In another example, Air Force MCIO guidance requires investigators to treat all absences as involuntary in the first instance, while guidance for the Army and Navy MCIOs does not. By revising guidance, commands and MCIOs will have a more consistent approach to absences and further their goal of quickly and safely locating absent service members. Why GAO Did This Study When a service member is absent from their unit, it may not be immediately clear if the absence is voluntary—that is, deliberate on the part of the service member—or involuntary, meaning the service member may be in danger. A timely and well-coordinated response to a service member’s absence is critical to establishing the facts and helping to ensure their safe return, if possible. House Report 118-125 includes a provision for GAO to review policies and procedures related to missing and absent service members. This report builds on GAO’s 2022 report on this topic and examines the extent to which DOD and the military services have clarified guidance for responding to incidents of absent service members, among other issues. GAO reviewed DOD guidance on responding to service member absences. GAO also visited a nongeneralizable sample of eight military installations, two per military service; reviewed the processes for responding to service member absences; and interviewed officials responsible for responding to such absences.

Why This Matters The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has primary responsibility for securing the 4,000-mile border between the United States and Canada. Border Patrol, within CBP, reported that apprehensions in this region more than tripled from fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024. As we reported in 2024, the agency has not met agent staffing targets in recent years. GAO Key Takeaways Border Patrol’s efforts to secure our nation’s borders include apprehending people suspected of illicit activity such as entry without inspection and drug smuggling. Apprehensions and drug seizures. From fiscal year 2023 to 2024, the number of people Border Patrol apprehended along the northern border increased sharply (see fig.). From fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024, the number of Border Patrol’s drug seizures in this region varied. Technology. CBP uses aircraft, vessels, and surveillance technology—such as cameras, radar sites, and sensors—as part of its efforts to secure the northern border. From fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2024, CBP’s deployment of this technology increased. Staffing. In this same 5-year period, the number of agents staffed along the northern border decreased, but CBP has initiatives underway to address this issue. In addition, there was a decrease in the staffing rate for Law Enforcement Information Systems Specialists who monitor surveillance technology. The staffing rate for this key position along the northern border has been below its target, and the agency does not have a plan with strategies to address the staffing gap. Developing such a plan could help Border Patrol better carry out its responsibility to secure the northern border. Border Patrol Apprehensions Along the Northern Border from Fiscal Year 2019 Through the First Half of Fiscal Year 2025 How GAO Did This Study We analyzed Border Patrol data on apprehensions and drug seizures, as well as CBP data on staffing and resources since fiscal year 2019. We visited six CBP units along the northern border, selected based on apprehension levels, among other factors. We also interviewed CBP officials from the other units along the northern border.

What GAO Found Under a 3-year pilot program, the Department of the Treasury’s Do Not Pay system has temporary access to the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) full Death Master File. Prior to the pilot, the system had access to a less-comprehensive version of the file which excluded state death records. In January 2026, Congress passed a bill that, if enacted, would make access permanent. In April 2025, Treasury reported that the first year of this pilot (calendar year 2024) resulted in identification and prevention or recovery of $113.5 million in improper payments. This amount, offset by $4.6 million in costs, represented a return on investment of about 23 times Treasury’s pilot costs. Treasury projects that the pilot will result in over $337 million in net benefits over 3 years. Death data collected by states are their property, and statute requires SSA to pay states for use of these data. In September 2023, SSA concluded negotiations on new contracts to obtain states’ death data. Under these contracts, SSA paid states $23.8 million in 2024, a significant increase from 2023. SSA’s Actual and Estimated Future Costs for State Death Records, 2023–2028 The Social Security Act, as amended, specifies that SSA shall reimburse states for specific costs associated with death data, including (1) a fee for use of the data and (2) the full documented cost of transmitting the data to SSA. However, GAO found that SSA did not obtain the required state cost information and therefore did not consider it during negotiations. Instead, SSA and the states agreed on a fee structure based on the timeliness of submission of death records. Agencies receiving state death data must pay SSA a proportional share of its costs in obtaining the data from states. Of the $25.9 million in estimated state death record costs for 2025, SSA’s proportional share is projected to decline, from 42 percent in 2024 to 23 percent in 2025, due to a methodology change. Specifically, SSA calculated its 2025 share based on the percentage of SSA’s total federal outlays rather than on costs of obtaining data. SSA estimated that its outlays were about 23 percent of the federal total, so it decided that would be its cost share for 2025. For the remaining 77 percent, SSA distributed 36 percent to Treasury and 41 percent to other agencies without regard to cost (each of the other agencies is to contribute the same amount, approximately $1.533 million). Why GAO Did This Study Improper payments remain a long-standing and significant problem in the federal government. GAO previously reported that one strategy to help prevent improper payments is up-front verification of eligibility through data sharing and matching. Agencies can verify the eligibility of applicants through Treasury’s Do Not Pay system—a centralized data-matching service for agencies to use in preventing and detecting improper payments. This service currently includes the full Death Master File, SSA’s compilation of deceased Social Security number holders, to help agencies prevent improper payments. This report (1) describes the first-year results of the 3-year pilot to include SSA’s full Death Master File in Treasury’s Do Not Pay system, (2) evaluates the extent to which SSA’s payments for state death data are based on states’ documented costs, and (3) evaluates the extent to which SSA is charging agencies a proportional share of its costs. GAO analyzed SSA and Treasury documentation and interviewed federal and state agency officials.