What GAO Found Operational testing—used to evaluate the capabilites of a new vessel to perform in realistic and relevant conditions—is critical to the Navy’s understanding of a vessel’s ability to counter the advances of its adversaries. Test Firing of a Navy Aircraft Carrier’s Ship Self-Defense System GAO found that Navy test and evaluation policy does not ensure consistent participation in test and evaluation working-level integrated product teams by key organizations representing the warfighter. Uncertainty about how warfighter organizations are represented in these teams—which are critical to test planning and execution for each shipbuilding program—poses challenges for ensuring that operational testing decisions reflect the current needs and interests of the fleet. GAO also found that the Navy does not have a plan to replace the test capability provided by its aging self-defense test ship. The Navy uses this remotely operated vessel to test the self-defense systems that protect ships from incoming missiles. The Navy lacks a clear plan for replacing the unique capabilities of its test ship, as intended. This creates uncertainty for how the Navy will fulfill future operational testing requirements. A gap in, or loss of, such test capability could increase the risk to warfighters and ships in conflicts with adversaries. In addition, while high-level Navy plans identify the need to invest in digital test infrastructure, GAO found that the Navy has yet to take coordinated action to respond to this need. For example, while some organizations had robust digital tools, GAO found that the Navy’s program-centric approach to fund, develop, and maintain digital test tools impedes investments in tools that could be widely used across shipbuilding programs. This program-centric approach also impairs the Navy’s ability to improve the timeliness and usefulness of operational testing. Without a cohesive plan for investing in the development and sustainment of its digital capabilities, the Navy risks not having the testing tools and infrastructure that it says it needs to confront an increasingly digital future—putting at risk U.S. warfighters’ ability to counter rapidly advancing adversaries. Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding programs must deliver vessels with the capabilities needed to outpace new threats in an evolving maritime environment. Operational testing is central to the Navy demonstrating such capabilities. A Senate report contains a provision for GAO to examine operational testing for Navy shipbuilding programs. GAO’s report addresses the extent to which (1) the Navy’s operational test and evaluation practices provide timely and useful information to acquisition decision-makers and warfighters, and (2) the Navy is developing and maintaining physical and digital test assets to support operational test and evaluation of its vessels. This is the public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in September 2025. GAO reviewed operational test and evaluation documentation related to Navy vessels, interviewed officials from the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and conducted site visits to three naval warfare centers and the Navy’s self-defense test ship.

What GAO Found Scams occur in a variety of forms and are a growing risk to consumers. Examples of a Scam Execution Process Note: Other types of contact methods, scams, and payment methods exist. At least 13 federal agencies engage in a range of activities related to countering scams. The agency activities cover a spectrum of roles intended to prevent, detect, and respond to scams. However, each agency largely carries out these activities independently. None of the 13 federal agencies that GAO spoke with were aware of a government-wide strategy to guide efforts to combat scams, nor did GAO independently identify such a strategy. In its April 2025 report, GAO recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lead a federal effort, in collaboration with other agencies, to develop and implement a government-wide strategy to counter scams and coordinate related activities. The FBI recently outlined actions to address this recommendation. The Consumer Protection Financial Bureau (CFPB), the FBI, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) collect and report on consumer complaints both directly and from other agencies. Data limitations prevent agencies from determining a total number of scam complaints and financial losses. Accordingly, there is no single, government-wide estimate of the total number of scams and financial losses. Similarly, federal agencies have not produced a common, government-wide definition of scams. A government-wide estimate would capture the scale of scams, and a common definition is necessary for producing such an estimate and for developing a government-wide strategy. In its April 2025 report, GAO made separate recommendations to CFPB, the FBI, and FTC to (1) develop a common definition of scams, (2) harmonize data collection, (3) report an estimate of the number of scam complaints each receives and (4) produce a single, government-wide estimate of the number of consumers affected by scams. In a recent update, the FBI and FTC outlined various concerns with these recommendations, such as differing authorities and mandates among agencies. However, GAO maintains that these recommendations remain valid. In October 2025, CFPB stated that it will monitor FBI and FTC actions before determining if any actions of its own are warranted. Why GAO Did This Study Scams, a method of committing fraud, involve the use of deception or manipulation intended to achieve financial gain. Scams often cause individual victims to lose large sums—in some cases their entire life savings. Federal agencies such as the FBI and FTC have responsibilities that include preventing and responding to scams against Americans. This statement discusses (1) federal agencies’ activities to prevent and respond to scams and the need for a comprehensive, government-wide strategy to guide their efforts and (2) federal agencies’ activities to compile scam-related consumer-complaint data and estimate the total number of scams and related financial losses. It also provides updates on the status of 3 agencies’ actions to address applicable recommendations. This statement is based on GAO’s April 2025 report on federal efforts to combat scams (GAO-25-107088). For that report, GAO analyzed publicly available information (including prior GAO reports) and relevant agency documents. GAO also interviewed officials from 13 different federal agencies involved in countering scams.

What GAO Found Before the Civil War, the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Muscogee (Creek), and Seminole Nations—known as the Five Tribes—had citizens who enslaved people. In 1866, each Tribe entered a treaty with the U.S. that abolished slavery and addressed tribal citizenship rights of the formerly enslaved people living among the Tribes. Historically, these people are referred to as “Freedmen.” Territories of the Five Tribes and Oklahoma, 1890 GAO estimates that the population of descendants of the Freedmen could have ranged from 146,400 to 395,400 in 2022. Since the 1800s, several courts have considered whether the Freedmen and their descendants are entitled to tribal citizenship or other rights under the 1866 treaties. In part because of those cases, Freedmen descendants are eligible to enroll as tribal citizens in the Cherokee and Seminole Nations, but not the Chickasaw or Choctaw Nations. Further, the Muscogee (Creek) Supreme Court recently ruled that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation must begin to permit its Freedmen descendants to enroll. Federal agencies administer a range of services, such as health care, education, and housing assistance, for the benefit of Tribes and their citizens, including enrolled Freedmen descendants. However, most of the 19 enrolled Freedmen descendants GAO interviewed said they encountered barriers accessing such services. Agencies have taken some actions to address these barriers, such as by clarifying enrollment eligibility. In addition, enrolled Freedmen descendants are regarded differently than other tribal citizens under certain federal statutes concerning land ownership and criminal jurisdiction. Why GAO Did This Study To better understand the status of Freedmen descendants, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held a hearing in 2022 on selected provisions of the 1866 treaties between the U.S. and the Five Tribes. The committee subsequently requested that GAO provide related information. This report (1) estimates the population of Freedmen descendants of the Five Tribes, (2) describes key court decisions on Freedmen descendants’ eligibility for tribal citizenship, (3) describes barriers to certain federal services identified by enrolled Freedmen descendants and agency actions to address them, and (4) describes how Freedmen descendants are regarded differently than other citizens of the Five Tribes under certain federal statutes. GAO conducted demographic modeling to estimate the population of Freedmen descendants of the Five Tribes as of 2022, the most recent year for which data were available. GAO reviewed the 1866 treaties, the Five Tribes’ constitutions, federal statutes, and key court cases from tribal and federal courts related to the tribal citizenship rights of the Freedmen descendants. GAO interviewed officials from the Cherokee Nation, an association that represents Freedmen descendants, 19 Freedmen descendants enrolled as tribal citizens in the Cherokee and Seminole Nations, and federal agency officials. For more information, contact Anna Maria Ortiz at ortiza@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment at the U.S. Coast Guard are not new. In its most recent report to Congress on this issue, covering fiscal year 2022, the Coast Guard reported 226 incidents of sexual assault and 88 incidents of sexual harassment. This report is required by law but fully included only 5 of the 11 required elements, partially included 4 of them, and did not include 2. Further, the Coast Guard submitted this report about 1 year late. The report covering fiscal year 2023 was due on January 15, 2024 and the report covering fiscal year 2024 was due on January 15, 2025. Both remained unissued, as of December 2025. Comparison of U.S. Coast Guard’s Fiscal Year 2022 Annual Report on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment to Statutory Reporting Requirements The Coast Guard’s process for compiling the annual report did not fully follow its own procedures. According to these procedures, cognizant program and legal offices are to conduct reviews. The service used outdated statutory language and templates with deficiencies over multiple years, raising questions about whether the legal review was sufficient. By ensuring that it addresses all required sexual assault and sexual harassment reporting requirements and meets the statutory deadline, the Coast Guard could better communicate complete and quality information for decision-making and oversight, and increase transparency to Congress on incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment. Why GAO Did This Study Since 2010, the Coast Guard has been required by law to submit an annual report to Congress on reported incidents of sexual assault and, since 2018, sexual harassment involving members of the Coast Guard. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s process for annually reporting on sexual assault and sexual harassment to Congress. This report examines (1) the Coast Guard’s processes to identify and compile sexual assault and sexual harassment data, and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard ensures that it reports on instances of sexual assault and sexual harassment to Congress as required. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documentation on its processes for identifying and compiling sexual assault and sexual harassment data. GAO analyzed the extent to which the sexual assault and sexual harassment report for fiscal year 2022—the most recent year available—incorporated required elements by comparing them to the law (14 U.S.C. § 5112). GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials from headquarters and from 5 of 9 Coast Guard districts.

What GAO Found The Coast Guard identified 49 actions to implement as part of its reform effort to address sexual misconduct since July 2023. As of September 2025, the service reported implementing 32 of them. These actions include revising policy to improve accountability for sexual misconduct and developing new training. Coast Guard officials cited several reasons why the 17 remaining actions are incomplete, including their complexity and transitions in the service’s leaders. The Coast Guard has taken steps to incorporate aspects of leading practices to support its reform efforts, but gaps in key areas may affect its ability to maintain progress and achieve lasting results to address sexual misconduct. Extent to Which the Coast Guard’s Reform Effort to Address Sexual Misconduct Followed Selected Leading Practices for Agency Reforms Specifically, GAO identified gaps in these areas: Involving employees and key stakeholders. The Coast Guard engaged employees and stakeholders (e.g., the Department of Defense) when developing its reforms but does not have a dedicated method for collecting feedback from its personnel. Establishing a two-way communication strategy would better ensure the Coast Guard has opportunities to collect and respond to employee feedback regarding the effects of the reforms. Leadership focus and attention. The service established a steering committee, but it has not met since November 2024. An active reform implementation team would help the Coast Guard maintain momentum. Managing and monitoring. The Coast Guard has not updated timelines or outlined clear next steps for incomplete reform actions. Developing a clear implementation plan with key milestones and updated time frames could help the Coast Guard pinpoint performance shortfalls and address challenges. Establishing goals and outcomes. The Coast Guard has not developed an evaluation plan to assess the effectiveness of its efforts, as GAO recommended in March 2024. Officials have begun to develop a service culture index to measure progress; however, it is incomplete. Strategic workforce planning. The service has added staff to support its reform efforts (e.g., 16 personnel at the Academy) but has not fully assessed workforce needs. Addressing GAO’s 2020 recommendation on workforce assessment planning would better ensure the Coast Guard has the right people in the units responsible for implementing the reform efforts. Why GAO Did This Study Sexual assault and sexual harassment (i.e., sexual misconduct) are serious offenses that can have lasting, harmful effects on victims. Incidents of sexual misconduct in the Coast Guard—a maritime military service within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—have generated congressional and media attention for nearly 2 decades. In July 2023, after media reporting on the mishandling of sexual assault cases, the Coast Guard directed a review to identify areas for organizational improvement and to counter sexual misconduct. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s effort to address sexual misconduct. This report examines (1) the reform actions the Coast Guard has taken since July 2023 to address sexual assault and harassment and (2) the extent to which the Coast Guard has followed selected leading agency reform practices to implement and sustain its reform efforts. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documentation on its reform actions and assessed them against selected leading practices for agency reform. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard officials from headquarters and from five of nine districts (selected based on size and geography) and visited one of these districts (New England) as well as the Coast Guard Academy.

What GAO Found In 2015, GAO issued A Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (Fraud Risk Framework). The Fraud Risk Framework provides a comprehensive set of leading practices, organized into four components, for program managers to use when developing or enhancing efforts to combat fraud in a strategic, risk-based manner. These four components include (1) committing to combat fraud by creating an organizational culture, (2) planning and conducting risk assessments, (3) designing and implementing a strategy with specific control activities, and (4) evaluating and adapting fraud risk management activities. As noted in the Fraud Risk Framework, program managers need to understand the effectiveness of their fraud risk management activities and adjust their efforts to better protect their resources against fraud. However, our work has shown that agencies face challenges in effectively implementing leading practices, particularly those found in Component 4 of the Fraud Risk Framework. Agencies continue to face these challenges, despite requirements to use the Fraud Risk Framework's leading practices to manage fraud risks. To aid program managers in these efforts, we developed this technical appendix to GAO's Fraud Risk Framework, which focuses on the implementation of Component 4: Evaluate Outcomes Using a Risk-Based Approach and Adapt Activities to Improve Fraud Risk Management. This appendix highlights various approaches that program managers have used, or could use, to evaluate and adapt fraud risk management activities described in the first three components of the Framework. These approaches can be modified to fit the circumstances and conditions relevant to different programs and activities. While the primary target audience is program managers in the U.S. federal government, the approaches may also be applicable to state, local, and foreign government agencies, as well as nonprofit entities, that are responsible for fraud risk management. Why GAO Did This Study Demonstrating strong internal controls and program integrity is important to protect taxpayer dollars and maintain public trust. In this way, evaluations can help agencies show the value of their fraud risk management activities. Program managers also need to understand the effectiveness of their fraud risk management activities so they can adjust their efforts to better protect their resources against fraud. Component 4 of GAO's Fraud Risk Framework describes how agencies can use robust evaluations that are comprehensive in scope, incorporate a range of metrics and outputs beyond financial returns, and use stakeholder input to better understand program outcomes. While agencies may have varying levels of resources, program managers can tailor evaluations to align with available capacity and the specific activities being assessed. To assist program managers with these efforts, we developed this technical appendix, which supplements and complements the Fraud Risk Framework. Specifically, we identified examples, methods, and considerations that can be used to help evaluate the effectiveness of fraud risk management activities. For more information, contact Rebecca Shea at shear@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In 2009, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) began a comprehensive effort to revise its disability rating schedule, which is criteria VA uses to determine veterans’ eligibility for disability compensation. This effort involves updating two sets of information. The first set—medical information—includes disabilities veterans may have, organized into 15 body systems. The second set—earnings loss—is the average decrease in expected earnings caused by those disabilities. Medical information. As of December 2025, according to VA officials, VA has updated medical information for 11 of the 15 body systems and planned to complete updates for the remaining four systems in fiscal year 2026—10 years after its originally planned completion date. Earnings loss information. Since May 2023, VA has been testing how to produce data from its earnings loss studies and update the rating schedule with this information. Past VA and external studies have evaluated the average loss of earnings for veterans with service-connected disabilities and suggest that certain veterans were not being equitably compensated (e.g., those with mental health conditions may be undercompensated). However, as of January 2026, VA has not updated its rating schedule with earnings loss information from any of its studies. Consequently, ratings determinations for all earnings loss calculations remain based on information from 1945. Since 2019, VA has taken steps to demonstrate progress on this high-risk area. For example, in 2024 VA issued an action plan that identified the root causes of the challenges it faces in updating the rating schedule, the actions it plans to take to address them, and metrics and milestones to monitor progress. VA has fully met three of the five criteria for disability rating schedule updates to be removed from GAO’s High-Risk List: Leadership Commitment, Action Plan, and Monitoring. To have this area removed from the list, VA must continue to meet these three criteria and fully meet two more: Capacity and Demonstrated Progress. VA has not fully defined the resources needed for, nor demonstrated adequate progress in, updating its medical and earnings loss information. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Progress Addressing Criteria for Removing Disability Rating Schedule Update from GAO High-Risk List VA must be able to accurately compensate veterans commensurately with the impact of their service-connected disabilities. Without a rating schedule that fully reflects present-day medicine and changes in the labor market since 1945, VA may overcompensate some veterans while undercompensating others. Why GAO Did This Study Veterans with injuries or illnesses incurred or aggravated during their military service may receive monthly disability payments from VA. VA administers one of the largest disability compensation programs in the nation. The department reported providing $195 billion in compensation to over 6.9 million veterans and their families in fiscal year 2025. Yet determinations of veterans’ eligibility for disability compensation are partially based on criteria that have not been updated in over 80 years. Partly due to the need to update the disability compensation criteria comprehensively, VA’s management of the disability compensation program has been on GAO’s High-Risk List since 2003. GAO was asked to testify on VA’s efforts to update its eligibility criteria for disability compensation. This testimony summarizes the status of VA's efforts and steps VA must take for the disability compensation program to be removed from the High-Risk List. This GAO testimony is based on findings from selected GAO reports issued from 2012 to 2025, particularly GAO’s High-Risk List updates. Information about the scope and methodology is available in the underlying reports. For more information, contact Elizabeth H. Curda at curdae@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The federal government has tools and resources to help agencies combat fraud and improper payments. GAO has recommended improvements to the use of these tools and resources. For example, Congress should consider making permanent the Social Security Administration’s requirement to share its full death data with the Do Not Pay system to help prevent fraud and improper payments. Further, GAO has identified leading practices for managing fraud risks at federal agencies and has made recommendations to agencies to implement these practices. For example, in 2024, GAO recommended that the Department of Defense revise its Fraud Risk Management Strategy to include data analytics as a method to address fraud. Further, by implementing GAO’s recommendation, the Small Business Administration identified $4.7 billion in loans from the Paycheck Protection Program that were made before September 2020 and that went to ineligible recipients or were used for unauthorized purposes. Programs Reporting the Largest Estimates of Improper Payments in Fiscal Year 2024 Artificial intelligence (AI) and data analytics have the potential to enhance efforts to combat fraud and improper payments but also have challenges. For example, data analytics and AI could help agencies sift through large volumes of data. However, agencies need solid, reliable data and a human in the loop to ensure data reliability and appropriate application of the technology. GAO’s AI Accountability Framework for Federal Agencies and Other Entities includes key practices for ensuring data used in AI systems are high quality, reliable, and appropriate for the intended purpose. Further, to improve the use of data analytics in identifying fraud and improper payments, GAO recommended in 2022 that Congress establish a permanent analytics center of excellence. Additionally, the federal government requires an AI-ready workforce if AI is to help combat fraud and improper payments. However, GAO has identified mission-critical gaps in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics skills within the federal workforce and has reported on challenges agencies face in attracting and developing individuals with AI expertise. Why GAO Did This Study The distinct, yet interrelated, problems of fraud and improper payments are long-standing and pervasive. Fraud involves obtaining something of value through willful misrepresentation. Improper payments are payments that should not have been made or that were made in the wrong amount. GAO estimated that the federal government loses between $233 billion and $521 billion annually due to fraud, based on data for fiscal years 2018 through 2022. Since fiscal year 2003, cumulative improper payment estimates reported by executive branch agencies have totaled about $2.8 trillion. In fiscal year 2024, five programs accounted for most improper payments. These issues impact the integrity of federal programs and erode public trust. The advancement of AI and other innovative technologies presents opportunities and challenges for combatting fraud and improper payments. This statement discusses (1) examples of tools and resources Congress and federal agencies can leverage to improve existing efforts to combat fraud and improper payments without the use of AI, (2) opportunities and challenges for using data analytics and AI to combat fraud and improper payments, and (3) challenges in developing an AI-ready federal workforce. This statement is based on a body of work GAO issued between 2015 and 2025 including GAO-25-108172, GAO-25-107508, GAO‑21‑519SP, and GAO-25-107653.

What GAO Found The Coast Guard, a multi-mission military service within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), uses its resources—including assets such as vessels and aircraft—to conduct its drug and migrant interdiction missions. Given limited resources, the Coast Guard made tradeoffs to address a significant increase in maritime migration levels that began in 2021. Specifically, it redirected assets to migrant interdiction that it had originally allocated to other missions, such as drug interdiction. This impacted its ability to conduct those other missions. The Coast Guard did not meet its primary drug interdiction performance target in fiscal years 2015 through 2024, and did not meet its primary migrant interdiction target for 6 years during the same period. See figures below. Coast Guard officials said neither primary measure effectively assesses its efforts. Thus, it began to implement new drug interdiction measures in fiscal years 2021 and 2022 to better assess its performance. As of July 2025, the Coast Guard had identified which would be its new primary drug interdiction measures. In addition, the Coast Guard is in the initial stages of developing new migrant interdiction performance measures, but as of July 2025 had not yet implemented them. Doing so would better position the Coast Guard to provide decision makers with relevant information to make future resource decisions. Coast Guard Annual Drug and Migrant Interdiction Primary Performance Measures The DHS Operation Vigilant Sentry task force provides a key coordination mechanism for the Coast Guard and about 10 federal partners responsible for maritime migrant interdiction. The Coast Guard and its federal partners generally followed seven of GAO’s eight leading collaboration practices identified in prior work. However, the task force did not fully share information on lessons learned. By implementing a process to identify and address lessons learned from events and sharing related reports with relevant federal partners, the task force would better address areas for improvement. This process could also help better manage fragmentation by ensuring all partners operate with similar information to support the migrant interdiction mission. Why GAO Did This Study The Coast Guard is the lead federal maritime agency responsible for interdicting illicit drug traffic and enforcing U.S. immigration laws and policies at sea. In fiscal years 2022 and 2023, it responded to the highest maritime migration levels in over 30 years. It has been conducting a migrant interdiction surge operation since August 2022. As of November 2025, the surge operation was ongoing. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s drug and migrant interdiction missions. This report examines, among other things: (1) the extent the Coast Guard met its drug and migrant interdiction mission performance targets in fiscal years 2015–2024, (2) how its maritime migration surge operation in fiscal years 2022–2024 affected its ability to perform its other statutory missions, and (3) the extent it coordinated with federal partners to conduct maritime migrant interdiction. GAO analyzed Coast Guard drug and migrant interdiction performance data, and reviewed relevant policies and documentation. GAO also conducted in-person site visits to Miami, Florida and San Diego, California and interviewed Coast Guard officials and DHS partner agencies to discuss drug and migrant interdiction operations and related coordination efforts.

What GAO Found The Coast Guard employs assets—including aircraft and vessels—and personnel to conduct law enforcement operations. In prior work, GAO identified longstanding challenges that have hindered the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its law enforcement mission demands. GAO made recommendations to help address asset availability, acquisitions, and workforce challenges, which the Coast Guard has yet to fully address. The Coast Guard’s vessels and aircraft have faced availability challenges and have been in a state of decline for decades. In June 2025 GAO found that the Medium Endurance Cutters availability to conduct missions declined from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2024. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard address maintenance challenges and operational availability issues with these cutters, which it relies on for law enforcement missions. The Coast Guard’s declining asset availability is exacerbated by persistent and longstanding challenges managing its planned $40 billion acquisition programs to modernize its vessels and aircraft. In November 2025, GAO found that continued delays and cost overruns with the Offshore Patrol Cutter program—one of its highest priority acquisitions—is likely. GAO made four recommendations to address these issues GAO has identified longstanding staffing shortfalls and poor workforce planning, which have challenged the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its mission needs. For example, in June 2025, GAO reported that cutter crew vacancy rates increased from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2024, according to the most recent Coast Guard data at the time. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard develop a clear plan to support its workforce retention initiatives, among other recommendations. Coast Guard Migrant Interdiction Why GAO Did This Study The U.S. government has identified transnational and domestic criminal organizations as a significant threat to the public, law enforcement, and national security. The Coast Guard is the nation’s lead federal maritime law enforcement agency. It received nearly $25 billion in supplemental funding in fiscal year 2025 for various acquisitions and in support of efforts to modernize operations and capabilities. The Coast Guard is a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It conducts maritime law enforcement, including: drug interdiction, migrant interdiction, and other missions (which include fisheries law enforcement work to prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing). This statement discusses Coast Guard challenges GAO previously identified related to its law enforcement missions. This statement is based primarily on six GAO reports published from June 2023 to January 2026.

What GAO Found Nonfederal law enforcement officers query encountered individuals against the terrorist watchlist during routine police interactions, such as traffic stops. After encountering a potentially terrorist watchlisted individual, nonfederal law enforcement officers receive instructions, via the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Threat Screening Center to determine whether the individual is a positive or negative match to the terrorist watchlist. GAO found that almost half of the law enforcement entities GAO interviewed in four states (12 of 26 entities, including police and sheriff’s departments) reported that officers were not consistently reporting encounters with potentially terrorist watchlisted individuals in instances where it is warranted. Seeking information to understand the extent to which nonfederal law enforcement entities are consistently reporting terrorist watchlist encounters could improve the accuracy of watchlist records. Nonfederal Law Enforcement Steps When Responding To Terrorist Watchlist Encounters aDispatchers may be used by police departments to query the National Crime Information Center instead of the responding officer. The Threat Screening Center uses outreach efforts to communicate terrorist watchlisting policies to nonfederal law enforcement entities that use the terrorist watchlist. However, GAO found that FBI has not ensured nonfederal law enforcement entities are aware of terrorist watchlist policies and has not taken steps to develop a communication plan for its outreach efforts. Developing a communication plan with goals and measures as well as periodic assessments of progress would help accomplish this. Additionally, FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services does not ensure states train NCIC users on terrorist watchlist policies. Without developing a process to review states’ efforts to do so, FBI cannot ensure that state training programs instruct nonfederal law enforcement to properly protect and respond to terrorist watchlist information. Why GAO Did This Study The Threat Screening Center, administered by FBI, is responsible for managing the terrorist watchlist. In recent years, Members of Congress have raised questions about how nonfederal entities use the terrorist watchlist. GAO was asked to examine the use of the terrorist watchlist by nonfederal law enforcement entities. This report examines (1) nonfederal entities’ reporting of terrorist watchlist encounters to FBI and opportunities for improvement and (2) steps FBI has taken to ensure nonfederal entities’ awareness of watchlist policies through outreach and state-led trainings. GAO reviewed watchlist policies and training resources for nonfederal entities and collected encounter data for fiscal years 2019 through 2024. GAO interviewed nonfederal law enforcement officials in four states selected based on the number of encounters and other factors. While not generalizable, these interviews provided insights into officials’ awareness of policies and training. This is the public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2025. Information on encounter data and official FBI instructions on handling watchlist encounters that FBI deemed sensitive has been omitted.