I'd like to thank my buddy Bonddad, with whom I am collaborating on "The Great Depression" series, for giving you a link over here, where I typically post.
At the moment I am absorbed with finishing that series, but I wanted to give you a flavor for the type of analysis you can expect from me. My nom de blog was actually inspired by the Schlesinger history quoted extensively in part 1 of the "Great Depression" series, and at the time I was very much surprised to find that it was still availalble (which is sad, no?).
I am not an economist, but as a private investor have watched the economy and the markets closely for nearly 20 years, and have developed an acumen for reading them. For example, a year ago as inflation was rising and looked like it might spiral out of control, I made bonddad a $50 bet that inflation at the end of 2008 would be less than it stood then. I based that on a belief that we were in a recession, and that demand destruction would inevitably lead to a decrease in inflation. A couple of weeks ago, bonddad paid off the bet.
When others were calling for Oil prices to shoot to $200 and beyond, I saw a bubble aided by Asian consumer subsidies and governments' Hoarding in Plain Sight by filling strategic Oil reserves.
When others were calling on China to continue to boom, I suspected that China's bubble was bursting (and it has).
In 2006, noting the huge but hidden leverage employed by hedge funds, I warned that the Gobal Economy was Bloated with Systemic Risk. I saw the housing bubble bursting and wrote that housing would be worse in 2007.
At the end of 2006, I saw a recession coming within a year. It started in December 2007. I started writing in August 2007 of what I described as a "Slow Motion Bust," in other words a 19th Century style deflationary panic that would unfold over the course of years as opposed to months, given the huge inflationary forces and expectations in the system. By November 2007, I was describing one step of that Bust as "The Panic of 2008" that would feature falling asset prices, rising commodity prices, stagnating wages, and possibly a liquidity trap. All 4 occured. by July it was clear that the Panic was in full force, and I wrote of how the Panic of 2008 was a long-term turning point in economic history. Most recently I described how the actions of the Administration, some Congressional leaders, and the Fed, helped turn a financial meltdown into a consumer panic during Black September 2008.
I'm not always right, and when I'm wrong, I fess up straightforwardly, and I always try to learn from my mistakes.
I am also an avid reader of history, and a fierce critic of traditional neoclassical economic theory, a non-falsifiable pseudoscience which uses calculus and pretensions to mathematical certainty to hide its ridiculous assumptions about human behavior, while still agreeing with Prof. Brad DeLong that "maximization plus equilibrium and is a neat way to look at things." I have written about the 1920s Credit Bubble in land, stocks, and consumer purchases, and why the initial contraction in 1929 turned into a major downturn in 1930. More fundamentally, I have written of how the modern political advocacy for globalization, which holds that trade prevents war, is Globalization's Biggest, Most Dangerous Lie of which World War 1 is a total refutation, and of how the long-term decline in US economic hegemony mirrors the decline of the British Empire before it.
I hope this gives you plenty to chew on if you didn't know me before, and thanking bonddad once again, I hope you'll continue to stop by to read not just me but the other bloggers here at the community of the Economic Populist.
Comments
very cool
Glad to see you and Bonddad collaborating.
I would have never guessed you are a critic of neoclassical economics.
Globalization
Your article mirrors that of Kevin Phillip's in his book Wealth and Democracy. The US is going through what Spain, the Netherlands, and Great Britain all went through as economic empires. They declined because of the overconcentration of wealth in the hands of a few.