The key indicators this week include July New Home Sales, the second estimate of Q2 GDP, Personal Income and Outlays for July, and Case-Shiller house prices for June.

----- Monday, August 25th -----
8:30 AM ET: Chicago Fed National Activity Index for July. This is a composite index of other data.

10:00 AM: New Home Sales for July from the Census Bureau.

This graph shows New Home Sales since 1963. The dashed line is the sales rate for last month.

The consensus is for 630 thousand SAAR, up from 627 thousand in June.

10:30 AM: Dallas Fed Survey of Manufacturing Activity for August.

----- Tuesday, August 26th -----
8:30 AM: Durable Goods Orders for July from the Census Bureau.  The consensus is for a 4.0% decrease in orders.

9:00 AM: S&P/Case-Shiller House Price Index for June.

This graph shows the year-over-year change in the seasonally adjusted National Index, Composite 10 and Composite 20 indexes through the most recent report (the Composite 20 was started in January 2000).

The National index was up 2.3% in May and is expected to slower further in June.

9:00 AM: FHFA House Price Index for June. This was originally a GSE only repeat sales, however there is also an expanded index.

10:00 AM: Richmond Fed Survey of Manufacturing Activity for August.

----- Wednesday, August 27th -----
7:00 AM ET: The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) will release the results for the mortgage purchase applications index.

----- Thursday, August 28th -----
8:30 AM: The initial weekly unemployment claims report will be released. The consensus is for initial claims to increase to 236 thousand from 235 thousand last week.

8:30 AM: Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2025 (Second Estimate) and Corporate Profits (Preliminary). The consensus is that real GDP increased 3.0% annualized in Q1, unchanged from the advance estimate.

10:00 AM: Pending Home Sales Index for July.  The consensus is for a 0.3% increase in this index.

11:00 AM: the Kansas City Fed manufacturing survey for August. This is the last of the regional Fed manufacturing surveys for August.

----- Friday, August 29th -----
8:30 AM: Personal Income and Outlays, July 2025. The consensus is for a 0.4% increase in personal income, and for a 0.5% increase in personal spending. And for the Core PCE price index to increase 0.3%.  PCE prices are expected to be up 2.6% YoY, and core PCE prices up 2.9% YoY.

9:45 AM: Chicago Purchasing Managers Index for August.

10:00 AM: University of Michigan's Consumer sentiment index (Preliminary for August).

From the Philly Fed:

The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has released the coincident indexes for the 50 states for July 2025. Over the past three months, the indexes increased in 41 states, decreased in eight states, and remained stable in one, for a three-month diffusion index of 66. Additionally, in the past month, the indexes increased in 38 states, decreased in five states, and remained stable in seven, for a one-month diffusion index of 66. For comparison purposes, the Philadelphia Fed has also developed a similar coincident index for the entire United States. The Philadelphia Fed’s U.S. index increased 0.5 percent over the past three months and 0.1 percent in July.
emphasis added

Note: These are coincident indexes constructed from state employment data. An explanation from the Philly Fed:

The coincident indexes combine four state-level indicators to summarize current economic conditions in a single statistic. The four state-level variables in each coincident index are nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing by production workers, the unemployment rate, and wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index (U.S. city average). The trend for each state’s index is set to the trend of its gross domestic product (GDP), so long-term growth in the state’s index matches long-term growth in its GDP.

Click on map for larger image.

Here is a map of the three-month change in the Philly Fed state coincident indicators. This map was all red during the worst of the Pandemic and also at the worst of the Great Recession.

The map is mostly positive on a three-month basis.

Source: Philly Fed.

And here is a graph is of the number of states with one month increasing activity according to the Philly Fed. 
This graph includes states with minor increases (the Philly Fed lists as unchanged).

In July, 39 states had increasing activity including minor increases.

From Goldman:

We boosted our Q3 GDP tracking estimate by 0.1pp to +1.5% (quarter-over-quarter annualized). Our Q3 domestic final sales estimate stands at +0.3%. We left our past-quarter GDP tracking estimate unchanged at +3.1%. [August 21st estimate]

And from the Atlanta Fed: GDPNow

The GDPNow model estimate for real GDP growth (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the third quarter of 2025 is 2.3 percent on August 19, down from 2.5 percent on August 15. After this morning’s housing starts release from the US Census Bureau, the nowcast of third-quarter real residential investment growth decreased from 1.1 percent to -5.9 percent. [August 19th estimate]

From Fed Chair Powell at Jackson Hole: Monetary Policy and the Fed’s Framework Review. Excerpts:

When I appeared at this podium one year ago, the economy was at an inflection point. Our policy rate had stood at 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent for more than a year. That restrictive policy stance was appropriate to help bring down inflation and to foster a sustainable balance between aggregate demand and supply. Inflation had moved much closer to our objective, and the labor market had cooled from its formerly overheated state. Upside risks to inflation had diminished. But the unemployment rate had increased by almost a full percentage point, a development that historically has not occurred outside of recessions.1 Over the subsequent three Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, we recalibrated our policy stance, setting the stage for the labor market to remain in balance near maximum employment over the past year.

This year, the economy has faced new challenges. Significantly higher tariffs across our trading partners are remaking the global trading system. Tighter immigration policy has led to an abrupt slowdown in labor force growth. Over the longer run, changes in tax, spending, and regulatory policies may also have important implications for economic growth and productivity. There is significant uncertainty about where all of these polices will eventually settle and what their lasting effects on the economy will be.

Changes in trade and immigration policies are affecting both demand and supply. In this environment, distinguishing cyclical developments from trend, or structural, developments is difficult. This distinction is critical because monetary policy can work to stabilize cyclical fluctuations but can do little to alter structural changes.

The labor market is a case in point. The July employment report released earlier this month showed that payroll job growth slowed to an average pace of only 35,000 per month over the past three months, down from 168,000 per month during 2024 (figure 2).2 This slowdown is much larger than assessed just a month ago, as the earlier figures for May and June were revised down substantially.3 But it does not appear that the slowdown in job growth has opened up a large margin of slack in the labor market—an outcome we want to avoid. The unemployment rate, while edging up in July, stands at a historically low level of 4.2 percent and has been broadly stable over the past year. Other indicators of labor market conditions are also little changed or have softened only modestly, including quits, layoffs, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, and nominal wage growth. Labor supply has softened in line with demand, sharply lowering the "breakeven" rate of job creation needed to hold the unemployment rate constant. Indeed, labor force growth has slowed considerably this year with the sharp falloff in immigration, and the labor force participation rate has edged down in recent months.

Overall, while the labor market appears to be in balance, it is a curious kind of balance that results from a marked slowing in both the supply of and demand for workers. This unusual situation suggests that downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment.

At the same time, GDP growth has slowed notably in the first half of this year to a pace of 1.2 percent, roughly half the 2.5 percent pace in 2024 (figure 3). The decline in growth has largely reflected a slowdown in consumer spending. As with the labor market, some of the slowing in GDP likely reflects slower growth of supply or potential output.

Turning to inflation, higher tariffs have begun to push up prices in some categories of goods. Estimates based on the latest available data indicate that total PCE prices rose 2.6 percent over the 12 months ending in July. Excluding the volatile food and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 2.9 percent, above their level a year ago. Within core, prices of goods increased 1.1 percent over the past 12 months, a notable shift from the modest decline seen over the course of 2024. In contrast, housing services inflation remains on a downward trend, and nonhousing services inflation is still running at a level a bit above what has been historically consistent with 2 percent inflation (figure 4).

The effects of tariffs on consumer prices are now clearly visible. We expect those effects to accumulate over coming months, with high uncertainty about timing and amounts. The question that matters for monetary policy is whether these price increases are likely to materially raise the risk of an ongoing inflation problem. A reasonable base case is that the effects will be relatively short lived—a one-time shift in the price level. Of course, "one-time" does not mean "all at once." It will continue to take time for tariff increases to work their way through supply chains and distribution networks. Moreover, tariff rates continue to evolve, potentially prolonging the adjustment process.

It is also possible, however, that the upward pressure on prices from tariffs could spur a more lasting inflation dynamic, and that is a risk to be assessed and managed. One possibility is that workers, who see their real incomes decline because of higher prices, demand and get higher wages from employers, setting off adverse wage–price dynamics. Given that the labor market is not particularly tight and faces increasing downside risks, that outcome does not seem likely.

Another possibility is that inflation expectations could move up, dragging actual inflation with them. Inflation has been above our target for more than four years and remains a prominent concern for households and businesses. Measures of longer-term inflation expectations, however, as reflected in market- and survey-based measures, appear to remain well anchored and consistent with our longer-run inflation objective of 2 percent.

Of course, we cannot take the stability of inflation expectations for granted. Come what may, we will not allow a one-time increase in the price level to become an ongoing inflation problem.

Putting the pieces together, what are the implications for monetary policy? In the near term, risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, and risks to employment to the downside—a challenging situation. When our goals are in tension like this, our framework calls for us to balance both sides of our dual mandate. Our policy rate is now 100 basis points closer to neutral than it was a year ago, and the stability of the unemployment rate and other labor market measures allows us to proceed carefully as we consider changes to our policy stance. Nonetheless, with policy in restrictive territory, the baseline outlook and the shifting balance of risks may warrant adjusting our policy stance.

Monetary policy is not on a preset course. FOMC members will make these decisions, based solely on their assessment of the data and its implications for the economic outlook and the balance of risks. We will never deviate from that approach.

What this means: On a weekly basis, Realtor.com reports the year-over-year change in active inventory and new listings. On a monthly basis, they report total inventory. For July, Realtor.com reported inventory was up 24.8% YoY, but still down 13.4% compared to the 2017 to 2019 same month levels. 
Here is their weekly report: Weekly Housing Trends: Latest Data as of Aug. 16

• Active inventory climbed 20.9% year over year

The number of homes active on the market climbed 20.9% year over year, easing slightly compared with the previous week for the ninth consecutive week. Nevertheless, last week was the 93rd consecutive week of annual gains in inventory. There were roughly 1.1 million homes for sale last week, marking the 16th week in a row over the million-listing threshold. Active inventory is growing significantly faster than new listings, an indication that more homes are sitting on the market for longer.

• New listings—a measure of sellers putting homes up for sale—rose 4.9% year over year

New listings rose 4.9% last week compared with the same period last year, a lower rate compared with the previous week, as the number of new listings remains below the spring and early summer norm. Homeowners are showing less urgency to list, as rising inventory and cautious buyer activity continue to temper the market.

• The median listing price was flat year over year

The median list price was flat compared with the same week in 2024. The median list price per square foot, which accounts for changes in home size, rose 0.1% year over year, extending its nearly two-year growth streak, though this represents the slowest growth rate over that period.

Note: Mortgage rates are from MortgageNewsDaily.com and are for top tier scenarios.

Friday:
• At 10:00 AM ET, Speech, Fed Chair Jerome Powell, Economic Outlook and Framework Review, At the 2025 Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, Moran, Wyoming